Sequestration
Republic
v. Saludares
327 SCRA 449
FACTS: The PCGG issued a writ of sequestration
against the Lianga Bay Logging Company, which was later lifted by the
Sandiganbayan. PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied.
Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a complaint for collection of a
sum of money against the company with prayer for preliminary attachment where
PCGG was not impleaded as defendant nor was the sequestration made known to the
RTC. The Court granted the preliminary attachment, and because of failure of
company to answer complaint, it also declared the company in default and ruled
in favor of private respondent. Petitioner argues that RTC has no jurisdiction
over the case since the sequestered assets are under custodia legis of the PCGG.
HELD: The SC ruled that the order of default of
the RTC is affirmed but should be held in abeyance until the sequestration case
is determined. However, the order of attachment was declared null and void. The
Court said that the disputed properties of the company were already under custodia legis by virtue of a valid writ
of sequestration issued by the PCGG when the judge issued the writ of
attachment. Since the writ of sequestration was already subsisting, it could
not be interfered with by the RTC because the PCGG is a coordinate and equal
body.
Public Corporations
I.
Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority
MMDA
v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
G.R. NO. 135962 (March 27, 2000)
FACTS: Respondent filed a case against
petitioner enjoining them from opening the Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of a
preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has
no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition
of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City
Council of Makati by ordinance. Hence this petition.
HELD: The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances
for the welfare of the community. Hence, its proposed opening of Neptune Street
which was not mandated by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City, is
illegal.
II.
Powers
A. Expropriation
Heirs
Of Suguitan v. City Of Mandaluyong
G.R. NO. 139087 (March 14, 2000)
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Mandaluyong City issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos to institute
expropriation proceedings over the property of Suguitan. The city filed a
complaint for expropriation when Suguitan refused to sell the property. The
city later assumed possession of the property by virtue of a writ of possession
issued by the trial court. The court later issued an order of expropriation.
Petitioners argue that the local government unit’s delegated power of eminent
domain must be exercised through the issuance of an ordinance, not by mere
resolution.
HELD: The law may delegate the power of eminent
domain to local government units that shall exercise the same through an
ordinance. The local government unit failed to comply with this requirement
when they exercised their power of eminent domain through a resolution. The Local Government Code’s requirement of an
ordinance prevails over the Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring the
issuance of a resolution.
B. Power To Sue And Be Sued
Mancenido
v. CA
G.R. NO. 118605(April 12, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioners, who are public school
teachers, filed a case against the provincial officials to compel them to pay
their claims for unpaid salary increases. In this petition for review on
certiorari, they argue that the CA erred in recognizing the authority of the
council of the provincial officials to file a notice of appeal.
HELD: The SC held that in resolving whether a
local government official may secure the services of private counsel in an
action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the action and
the relief sought are to be considered. In view of the damages sought in the
case at bar which, if granted, could result in personal liability, respondents
could not be deemed to be improperly represented by private counsel.
C. Registration Of Tricycle And Licensing
Of Drivers
Land
Transportation Office v. City Of Butuan
322 SCRA 805
FACTS: The issue in this case is whether under
the present set-up the power of the LTO to register, tricycles in particular,
as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has likewise devolved to
local government units.
HELD: The SC ruled that the registration and
licensing functions are vested in the LTO while franchising and regulatory
responsibilities are vested in the LTFRB. Under the Local Government Code, LGUs
have the power to regulate the operation of tricycle for hire and to grant
franchise for the operation thereof.
III.
Qualification
Of Local Elective Officials
Torayno
v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 137329 (August 9, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves a petition for quo
warranto filed against the respondent on the ground that he was not able to
fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City when he ran
for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3
consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and
subsequently ran for mayor.
HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the
residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a mayoralty candidate. He
bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided there before
he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.
IV.
Legislation
Malonzo
v. Zamora
323 SCRA 875
FACTS: A supplemental budget was passed by the
councilors upon three readings held on the same day. They were charged with misconduct.
HELD: There is no law prohibiting the holding
of the three readings of a proposed ordinance in one session day.
V.
Recall
Afiado
v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 141787 (September 18, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves a petition asking for
the annulment of a resolution calling for the recall of the vice-mayor. The
barangay officials in a preparatory recall assembly passed this resolution. The
proclaimed mayor at that time was the son of the previous mayor who had already
served for 3 consecutive terms. The father ran for a 4th term but
withdrew, and was substituted by the son. The opponent filed a petition asking
for the annulment of the substitution. When the SC ruled that the substitution
was invalid, the vice-mayor became the mayor. Hence this petition.
HELD: The
specific purpose of the preparatory recall assembly was to revive the
vice-mayor. However, the resolution does not apply to the vice-mayor anymore,
since she gave up the office of vice-mayor when she assumed the position of
mayor.
Administrative
Law
I.
Regulations
A. Power
Philippine
Registered Electrical Practicioners v. Francia
322 SCRA 587
FACTS: Petitioner assails a resolution issued
by the Board of Electrical Engineering which provided for a Continuing
Professional Education (CPE) Program for electrical engineers which required
that they must earn credit units of CPE before their licenses could be renewed.
Before these credit units could be earned, they must first apply for
accreditation with the Institute of Integrated Electrical Engineers of the
Philippines. Petitioner argues that the resolution is violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and mandate for the
protection of the rights of workers.
HELD: The SC denied the petition for being moot
and academic. President Ramos had later issued E.O. No. 266, which imposed upon
registered professionals, the completion of the CPE as a pre-requisite for the
renewal of their licenses.
SGMC
Realty Corporation v. Office Of The
President
G.R. NO. 126999 (August 30, 2000)
FACTS: On October 23, 1995, petitioner got a
copy of the decision of the Board of Commissioner of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Office of the President on
November 20, 1995, but this was denied for having been filed outside of the
required period. Petitioner argues that the period for appeal is actually 30 days
pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
and Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987.
HELD: The SC ruled that the 30-day period of
appeal is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods
of appeal applicable. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 and Section 2
of P.D. No. 1344 provide that the decision of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from the date of
its receipt. The period of appeal of 30 days in the Rules of Procedure of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board is invalid for being in conflict with
Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1344.
Zabat
v. CA
G.R. NO. 122089 (August 23, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner filed this case questioning
the award of a certain lot to the respondent by the Awards and Arbitration
Committee of the National Housing Authority which declared petitioners as
absentee owners. The National Housing Authority signed a contract to sell with
respondent, and sent a notice of demolition to petitioner. Hence this petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that petitioner should have
exhausted all applicable administrative remedies. All decisions of the Awards
and Arbitration Committee are subject to review by the General Manager.
Petitioner should have appealed the award of the lot and the execution of the
contract to sell to the Office of the President.
Province
Of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA
G.R. NO. 109853 (October 11, 2000)
FACTS: Zamboanga
del Norte Electric Cooperation increased the fuel compensation charge without
the approval of the Energy Regulatory Board.
As a result, petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC.
HELD: The Energy Regulatory Board has
jurisdiction over the fixing of power rates to be charged by electric
cooperatives. Petitioner should have exhausted the available administrative
remedies before resorting to the court.
Pimentel v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 132988
(July 19, 2000)
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued
by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their
expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order,
which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate
local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of
national government intervention by way of supervision,
in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent
with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been
issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local
governments. A directory order cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended only to advise all
government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures
that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to
interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are
met: (1) an unmanaged public sector
deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding
officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of
the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the
secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and
Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case
be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the
third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. This is mandated by the
Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly
contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Solar
Entertainment and People of the Philippines v. Hon. How
G. R. No. 140863 (August 22, 2000)
FACTS: The question raised in this case is whether or not the trial
court can indefinitely suspend the arraignment of the accused until the
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice has been resolved, without
violating RA 8493, otherwise known as “The Speedy Trial Act of 1998”.
HELD: The power
of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after
the information has already been filed in court is well-settled. Procedurally speaking, after the filing of
the information, the court is in complete control of the case and any
disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. The decision to suspend arraignment to await
the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of
such discretion. Thus, public respondent
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it suspended arraignment to await
the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. The SC stressed that the court is not bound
to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated
to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either
agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has already been
filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with the Speedy
Trial Act. Section 7 of the Act
prescribing the 30-day period for the arraignment of the accused is not
absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the law
enumerates periods of delay that shall be excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence. The
exceptions provided in the Act reflect the fundamentally recognized principle
that the concept of “speedy trial” is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.
Recently, the DOJ issued Memorandum Order No. 12 dated
July 3, 2000 mandating that the period for the disposition of appeals/petition
for review shall be 75 days. In view of
this memorandum, the indefinite suspension of proceedings in the trial court
because of a pending petition for review with the Secretary of Justice is now
unlikely to happen.
Isagani Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, et al
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar
Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on
the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous
peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. The Commission on Human Rights asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous
people. It prays that the petition be
dismissed.
HELD: After due
deliberation, 7 voted to dismiss the petition, while 7 other members of the
Court voted to grant the petition. As
the votes were equally divided and the necessary majority was not obtained, the
case was redeliberated upon. However,
after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Public
Officers
I.
Appointment
Marohombsar
v. CA
326 SCRA 62
FACTS: Private respondent was first appointed as
Technical Assistant. The position was subsequently reclassified and retitled to
Executive Assistant II. Since the private respondent did not possess the
appropriate civil service eligibility required of the position, she was
extended a temporary appointment only. She was later extended a permanent
appointment when she acquired a Career Service Professional Eligibility. When
petitioner became the President of MSU, private respondent was later dismissed.
Petitioner argues that the dismissal was legal since the private respondent’s
appointment lacks the requisite confirmation by the Board of Regents.
HELD: Ad interim appointments are permanent but
their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. There is absolutely no
showing that the Board of Regents disapproved private respondent’s appointment.
Since the private respondent holds an appointment under permanent status, he
enjoys security of tenure as guaranteed by law.
II.
Termination
Salvador
v. CA
G.R.
NO. 127501 (May 5, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner had been a permanent employee
of the DENR when it was reorganized under E.O. No. 192. This resulted in the
conversion of the positions of several employees to coterminous. The petitioner
was one of the employees who were offered a coterminous position. Petitioner
later filed a complaint along with other employees. The court decided in their
favor, and ordered the reinstatement of the employees. DENR failed to comply
with this order. Meanwhile, petitioner applied for a new opening in the company
but was ignored.
HELD: Petitioner was covered by the decision of
the court and thus entitled to reinstatement. His act of applying for a new
position cannot be construed against him.
III.
Administrative
Case
Conseñares
v. Almeida
324 SCRA 388
HELD: A case against a public officer should
not be dismissed even if the complainant has withdrawn it. (See also Lapeña v. Pamarang 325 SCRA 440;
and Farrales v. Camorista 327 SCRA 84)
Secretary
Of Education, Culture And Sports v. CA
G.R. NO. 128559 (October 4, 2000)
FACTS: The Secretary of Education, Culture, and
Sports filed charges against several public school teachers for refusing to
obey his return-to-work order, thus incurring unauthorized absences for
participating in a mass action.
HELD: The SC held that petitioners were liable
for their participation in the mass actions which actually amounted to a strike
since they were involved in the concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work.
IV.
Rights,
Privileges And Benefits
Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports v. CA
G.R. No. 128559 (October 4, 2000)
HELD: A public officer found guilty is not
entitled to backwages.
ELECTION
LAW
I.
Certificate
Of Candidacy
A. Deficiency
Conquilla
v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139801 (May 31, 2000)
FACTS: Alarilla filed his Certificate of
Candidacy without indicating the position he was aspiring for. However, he
attached a Certification which indicated that he was being nominated for the
position of municipal mayor. He was later proclaimed as the mayor-elect.
Petitioner argues that the Certificate of Candidacy should be declared null and
void for failing to specify the elective position that Alarilla was running
for.
HELD: Alarilla’s failure to specify the public
office he was seeking in his Certificate of Candidacy was not a fatal defect.
First, there was an attached certification which stated that he was being
nominated for the position of municipal mayor. Second, Alarilla had rectified
the deficiency by filing an Amended Certificate. Third, there was a Certified
List of Candidates listing Alarilla for the position of mayor. Finally,
Alarilla was elected mayor. If substantial compliance with the Election Law
should give way to a mere technicality, the will of the electorate, as far as
Alarilla is concerned, would be frustrated.
B. Disqualification
II.
Casting
of Votes
A. Postponement of Election
Basher
v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139028 (April 12, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for Punong Barangay. The election was declared a failure and a
special one was scheduled. Again, the election failed and was reset. However,
the voting only started at 9PM because of the prevailing tension in the
locality. Private respondent was proclaimed the winner. Petitioner filed a
petition with the COMELEC to declare the election as a failure alleging that no
election was conducted in the place and at the time prescribed by law. COMELEC
dismissed the petition.
HELD: The SC ordered the conduct of a special
election. The Court held that the peculiar set of facts in the present case
show not merely a failure of election but the absence of a valid electoral
exercise. The place where the voting was conducted was illegal. As to the time
of voting, the law provides that the casting of votes shall start at 7 in the
morning and end at 3 in the afternoon. The election officer did not follow the
procedure laid down by law for election postponement or suspension or the
declaration of a failure of election. The electorate was also not given ample
notice of the exact schedule and venue of the election.
B. Failure of Election
Banaga
v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 134696 (July 31, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner had filed a petition for
declaration of failure of election on grounds of vote buying and glaring
discrepancies in the election returns. The COMELEC dismissed the case declaring
that the above grounds do not fall within the scope of failure of election.
HELD: To
warrant a declaration of failure of election, the commission of fraud must be
such that it prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or fatally
affected the preparation and transmission, custody and canvass of the election
returns. These essential facts ought to have been alleged clearly by
petitioner, but he did not.
Benito v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134913
(Jan 19, 2001)
FACTS: Benito and private respondent Pagayawan were 2 of 8
candidates vying for the position of municipal mayor in Calanogas, Lanao del
Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 precincts clustered in the Sultan
Disimban Elementary School were met with violence when some 30 armed men
appeared at the school premises and fired shots into the air. This sowed panic
among the voters and elections officials, causing them to scatter in different
directions. It happened before noon at the day of election. A spot report
reported the incident.
Both parties are contending contrary
facts. Petitioner alleged that the voting never resumed even after the lawless
elements left. On the other hand, private respondent alleged that voting
resumed when the armed men left around 1 pm in the afternoon. Petitioner is only asking, however, a
declaration of failure of elections on the first three precincts, not with the
entire five precincts. During the counting, the ballots from the three
precincts were excluded. Nevertheless, the winner was the private respondent.
And even if the votes from the three excluded precincts were added, private
respondent still emerged as the winner.
Petitioner then filed a petition to
declare failure of election and to call a special election. COMELEC however
denied the petition and affirmed the proclamation.
Held: Petition Dismissed.
1. Two preconditions must exist before a
failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting has been held in any
precinct due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes not
cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of
such failure may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the day of
the election.
2. Whether there was a resumption of
voting is essentially a question of fact. Such are not proper subjects of
inquiry in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
3. Voting in all five precincts resumed
after peace and order was re-established in the Disimban Elementary School.
There was no objection raised to the count of votes in the said two precincts
during the counting of votes at the counting center. So why a selective
objection to the three precincts herein?
4. Petitioner equates failure of elections
to the low percentage of votes cast vis-à-vis the number of registered voters
in the subject election precincts. However, there can be a failure of election
in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot
be ascertained. But if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After
all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority
of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a
winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of
the actual number of ballots cast.
5. The power to throw out or annul an
election should be exercised with the utmost care and only under circumstances
which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the law had been so
fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to
distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any
certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of voters have been prevented
by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise.
C. Jurisdiction to declare a failure of elections
Carlos v. Angeles
G.R. No. 142907
(Nov. 29, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998 elections. The
Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the mayor. The private respondent filed an election
protest with the RTC. The court came up
with revision reports which also showed that the petitioner got the highest
number of votes. Nevertheless, in its
decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of
its finding of "significant badges of fraud," which it attributed to
the present petitioner. The court then declared private respondent as the
winner. The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, and also filed a petition to
the SC questioning the decision of the RTC.
The private respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the SC.
HELD: Both the
SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general
jurisdiction (RTCs) in election cases involving elective municipal officials.
The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over the case. Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC,
the same would not bar the present action as an exception to the rule because
under the circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
The power to nullify an election must be exercised with the
greatest care with a view not to disenfranchise the voters, and only under
circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial measure. More
importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of
election. It is the COMELEC en banc that
is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. Assuming
that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the
extent of that power is limited to the annulment of the election and the
calling of special elections. The result is a failure of election for that
particular office. In such case, the court cannot declare a winner.
III.
Counting
Of Ballots
A. Counting of Votes
Villarosa vs. HRET
G.R. No. 143351,
September 14, 2000
FACTS:
Quintos contested the proclamation of Amelita
Villarosa. Issue: whether “JTV” votes
should be counted in favor of Villarosa. “JTV” is the nickname of Villarosa’s
husband, who is the incumbent representative of Occidental Mindoro.
HELD:
Villarosa’s use of “JTV” as her nickname was a clever ploy
to make a mockery of the election process. HRET did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in holding that the only issue for its determination was whether
"JTV" votes or variations thereof should be counted in favor of
VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes.
Columbres vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 142038,
September 18, 2000
Two issues: (1)
Whether the findings of fact of the COMELEC Division, especially in matters of
appreciation of ballots, is absolute and cannot be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc;
(2)
Whether in appreciation of ballots, when a ballot is found to be marked, absent
any evidence aliunde, there is the presumption that the markings were placed by
a third person, and therefore, should not invalidate the ballot.
Held:
(1) No. What is being challenged is not the sufficiency of
evidence but the appreciation thereof by the COMELEC Division. If the
appreciation of the Division is erroneous, there is the implication that such
finding or ruling is contrary to law and thus, may be a proper subject of a
motion for reconsideration.
(2) No. There is no such presumption in law. Instead, the
legal presumption is that the sanctity of the ballot has been protected and
preserved.
The case was remanded back to the COMELEC en banc.
B. Defects In Ballot
Pacris
v. Pagalilawan
Adm. Matter No. RTJ-98-1403 (August 14, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves the election protest
filed by the private respondent against the petitioner who was declared as
mayor. The case was decided in favor of the private respondent. Petitioner
argues that the respondent invalidated several ballots cast in his favor due to
undetached upper stubs.
HELD: The SC upheld the validity of the
ballots. The Court declared that the voters must not be disenfranchised because
of the failure of the election officials to perform their duties, one of which
involves the detachment of the upper stubs.
Also, a ballot should not be invalidated because it was not signed at
the back
C. Effect of Failure
to Authenticate Ballots
Malabaguio v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 142507 (
December 1, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
both candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay 172, Kalookan
City. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Punong
Barangay. The petitioner filed an
election protest case with the MTC. The
rendered a judgment declaring the petitioner as the winner. Private respondent filed a case with the
COMELEC. The 2nd Division set aside the MTC’s decision, and declared
the private respondent as the winner. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed,
but was denied by the COMELEC en banc.
The petitioner now questions the disregarding of the 57 ballots cast in
favor of petitioner which do not bear the signatures of the chairmen of the
board of election inspectors, considering that private respondent won by only
54 votes over petitioner.
HELD: In invalidating the 57 ballots, the
COMELEC relied on several laws which basically said that the signatures of the
particular authorities are needed to validate the ballots. However, the SC ruled that “It is correct to
postulate that administrative findings of facts are accorded great respect, and
even finality when supported by substantial evidence. Nevertheless, when it can
be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such
nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, this Court has not hesitated to
reverse their factual findings. Factual findings of administrative agencies are
not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.”
The COMELEC has already promulgated a new set of rules which
states that the failure to authenticate the ballots shall not invalidate them.
Rather, the Board of Election Inspectors shall merely note such failure in the
minutes and declare the failure to authenticate the ballots as an election
offense. “Consequently, the absence of
the Chairmen's signature at the back of the ballot should not be a reason to
invalidate the 57 ballots which are genuine. Hence, all votes indicated in
these ballots must be counted in favor of the petitioner because the intent of
the voters to vote for him is crystal.”
IV.
Canvassing
Immam
v. COMELEC
322 SCRA 866
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent both
ran for mayor. Of the 55 precincts, only the votes cast in 41 precincts were
certified as counted. Private respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC to
count the ballots cast at the elections and for holding of special elections
with prayer for issuance of a TRO &/or writ of preliminary injunction.
While the petition was pending, the petitioner was proclaimed as the mayor.
Private respondent filed a case asking that the proclamation of the petitioner
be declared void. COMELEC suspended the effects and consequences of
petitioner’s proclamation. Hence this petition.
HELD: The effects of proclamation of only one
candidate may be suspended where the validity of his election is still subject
to determination. COMELEC has jurisdiction to suspend oath-taking of proclaimed
candidate on account of incomplete canvass of votes. A canvass cannot be
reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered
and none is omitted. This is true when the election returns missing or not
counted will affect the results of the election.
V.
Pre-Proclamation
Cases
A. Correction Of Manifest Errors
Angelia
v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139468 (MAY 31, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner was
proclaimed as a member, ranking 8th with 4 votes more that the
private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition to annul the
proclamation presenting copies of Election Returns which showed a tally of 92
votes for private respondent but indicated a corresponding total in words and
figures of only 82 votes. There was also a copy which showed a tally of only 13
votes for private respondent but indicated a corresponding total in words and
figures of 18 votes. These copies were supported by affidavits from a poll
clerk and the chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors. COMELEC annulled
the proclamation of petitioner. Hence this petition.
HELD: In accordance with the Court’s ruling in
Castromayor v. COMELEC, the expedient action to take is to direct the Municipal
Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice and hearing in accordance
with Rule 27, § 7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect the necessary
corrections, if any, in the election returns and, on the basis thereof,
proclaim the winning candidate/s.
B.
Defective Returns
1. Formal Defects
Ocampo
v. COMELEC
326 SCRA 636
HELD: Formal defects are not
grounds for excluding an election return.
2.
Statistically
Improbable Returns
Velayo
v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 135613 (March 9, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for mayor. Private respondent filed several cases with the COMELEC.
Petitioner was proclaimed as mayor. COMELEC en
banc issued a resolution annulling the proclamation and declaring private
respondent as the winner. Hence this petition.
HELD: Standing alone and without more, the bare
fact that a candidate for public office received zero votes in one or two
precincts cannot adequately support a finding that the subject election returns
are statistically improbable. The doctrine on statistical improbability must be
viewed restrictively, the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing the
fraudulent and corrupt practices, innocent voters become disenfranchised.
Moreover, the doctrine involves a question of fact and a more prudential
approach prohibits its determination ex
parte.
Ocampo
v. COMELEC
325
SCRA 636
HELD: If only one candidate obtained all the
votes in some precincts, this is not sufficient to make the election returns
statistically improbable.
3. Duress
Sebastian
v. COMELEC
327
SCRA 406
HELD: Duress cannot be
raised as an issue in a pre-proclamation case.
VI.
Election
Contests
A. Payment of Docket Fee
Enojas
v. Gacott
322 SCRA 272
HELD:
An election protest should not be dismissed despite a deficiency in
the docket fee, because it involves public interest.
Soller
v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 139853 (September 5, 2000)
HELD:
An election protest should be dismissed if the correct docket fee is
not paid.
B. Verification
Soller
v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139853 (September 5, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves an election protest
filed by respondent against petitioner who was proclaimed as mayor. The protest
included a verification stating that it was respondent who prepared the protest
and, that he read and understood all its allegations.
HELD: The SC declared the verification as
insufficient because of the failure of respondent to state that the contents of
the election protest are true, correct and of his personal knowledge. The SC
held that the protest should be considered as an unsigned pleading because of
the lack of the proper verification.
C. Certificate Of Absence Of Forum Shopping
Soller
v. COMELEC
G.R.
No. 139853 (September 5, 2000)
HELD: Election protest should contain
certificate of non-forum shopping.
Barroso
v. Ampig
G.R. NO. 138218 (March 17, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for mayor. Private respondent filed several cases against the
petitioner with the COMELEC. He also filed criminal complaints with the Law
Department of the COMELEC. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner. Private
respondent filed an election protest with the RTC. Of the 5 cases which he had
previously filed, he only mentioned the 3 as pending.
HELD: Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not
apply to election cases, except by analogy or in a suppletory character.
Election contests are subject to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Rule 35 which
is applicable in this case, does not require that the petition contesting the
election of a municipal official be accompanied by a certification or any
statement against forum shopping. Applying the Rules of Civil Procedure
suppletorily, the failure to comply with the non-forum shopping requirements
does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the case with prejudice.
D. Motion To Dismiss
Maruhom
v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139397 (May 5, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for mayor. Because of several irregularities, anomalies and
electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as the winner.
Petitioner filed a case with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation, but later
withdrew it. He also filed an election protest with the RTC. Petitioner orally
moved for dismissal of the protest, but it was denied. The court ordered the
Revision Committee to convene and start the revision of the ballots. Petitioner
alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
petition.
HELD: The SC held that the summary dismissal of
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss was not a grave abuse of discretion by the
COMELEC. The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a
perfidious plot to prevent the early termination of the proceedings as
evidenced by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed
by petitioner to avert the revision ballots. Also, a motion to dismiss is not a
prohibited pleading in an election contest filed before the regular courts.
E. Certiorari
Beso
v. Aballe
326 SCRA 100
HELD: The COMELEC has jurisdiction over a
petition for certiorari in election contests pending in the inferior courts.
F. Motion For Reconsideration
Columbres
v. COMELEC
G.R.
NO. 142038 (September 18, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner filed an election protest
against respondent who was proclaimed as mayor. The RTC decided in favor of
petitioner, but the decision was reversed by the 2nd Division of the
COMELEC in an appeal filed by respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration questioning the decision of the division to validate the marked
ballots cast in favor of the respondent. The MR was denied by the COMELEC en banc which declared that findings of
fact cannot be a subject of an MR. Hence this petition.
HELD: Any question on the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assailed ruling of a Division is
also a proper subject for a motion for reconsideration.
G. Execution Pending Appeal
Fermo
v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 140179 (March 13, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for Punong Barangay. The latter was proclaimed as the winner.
Petitioner filed an election protest. The court ruled in favor of petitioner.
Private respondent appealed this decision to COMELEC. Petitioner filed a motion
for execution pending appeal which was granted by the court. The private
respondent appealed this decision to the COMELEC, which the latter reversed.
Hence this petition.
HELD: COMELEC did not err in reversing the
decision. Only one ground was used by petitioner to support his petition i.e.
“shortness of term”, which the SC considered as insufficient. The order of
COMELEC for the petitioner to relinquish his post to the private respondent
pending final resolution of the appeal is a logical and necessary consequence
of the denial of execution pending appeal.
VII.
Election
Offenses
A. Jurisdiction
Juan
v. People
322 SCRA 125
HELD: It is the RTC which has jurisdiction over
election offenses.
B. Procedure
Laurel
v. Presiding Judge, RTC Of Manila
G.R. NO. 131778 (January 28, 2000)
C. Offenses
1. Transfer Of Government Employee
Regalado
v. CA
325
SCRA 516
FACTS: Mayor Navarro appointed Barba as a
nursing attendant. When he ran for mayor, the petitioner was appointed as
OIC-mayor. Petitioner issued a memorandum informing Barba that she would be
reassigned. This transfer was made without prior approval of COMELEC. Barba
filed a complaint against petitioner for violation of § 261 (h) of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner was later charged and convicted of the offense.
HELD: Indeed, appointing authorities can
transfer or detail personnel, as the exigencies of public service require.
However, during election period, as such personnel movement could be used for
electioneering or even to harass subordinates who are of different political
persuasion, § 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, prohibits the
same unless approved by the COMELEC.
2. Carrying
Firearm
Caña
v. Gebusion
A.M. NO. P-98-1284 (March 30, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner (judge) filed a complaint
against private respondent (Sheriff IV in the same court as petitioner) for
violation of the Civil Service Law, the Firearms Law, and the Omnibus Election
Code. In addition, respondent was also accused of carrying a revolver without a
license and of threatening to kill complainant for having filed the above
charges. An investigation was conducted, and the respondent was found guilty of
several of the charges.
HELD: The SC ruled that respondent should be
dismissed from service. One of the reasons is that by possessing a firearm
without the necessary license, he committed a serious misconduct.
VIII. Party-List System
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 1136781 (October 6, 2000)
FACTS: On May 11, 1998, the first election for
the party-list scheme was held simultaneously with the national elections. One
hundred and twenty-three parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen party-list representatives from twelve
parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system.
Thirty-eight defeated parties and
organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC, pleading for their own
proclamations. Hence, COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38 parties. Such
move filled up the 52 seats allotted for the party-list reps. Aggrieved, the proclaimed parties asked the
SC to annul the COMELEC action and instead to proclaim additional seats, so
that each of them would have three party-list reps.
HELD:
1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? SC: The 20% allocation is only a ceiling and not mandatory.
2. Are the 2% threshold requirement and
the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? SC: Yes. Congress was vested with the
broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system.
3. How then should the additional seats of
a qualified party be determined? SC: As to the method of allocating additional
seats, the first step is to rank all the participating parties according to the
votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against
the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined.
All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an
assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, those
garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes. The formula for additional
seats of other qualified parties is:
no.of votes of concerned party divided by
no.of votes of first party multiplied by no. of additional seats allocated to
the first party. As for the first party, just take it at face value. ( 5% = 2
seats )
IX. Right of Suffrage - Special
Registration before the General Elections
Akbayan vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066 (March 26,2001)
Betito vs. Benipayo
G.R. No. 147179
(March 26,2001)
FACTS:
Consolidated cases regarding the Right to Suffrage.
Petitioners are asking the COMELEC to hold a special registration before the
May 14, 2001 General Election. After hearings, meetings and consultations, the
COMELEC denied the request for special registration on the grounds (1) it is
against the law, and (2) impossibility. The case was elevated to SC.
HELD:
1. The right of suffrage is not at all
absolute. It is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements. As
to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily
conditioned upon the process of registration. The act of registration is an
indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. The State, undoubtedly
then, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration.
2. The period barring any registration
before the general elections has its purpose. It is meant to complement the
prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion of voters from the list.
Stated otherwise, if a special registration is conducted on a later date, the
period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later
date. If not, then there can be no challenge to the voter’s list. It will then
open the registration process to abuse.
3. Petitioners cannot also rely on the
standby or residual powers of the COMELEC, under Sec 28, R.A. 8436 [which
provides that if the COMELEC cannot observe the periods and dates prescribed by
law for certain pre-election acts, it can fix another period]. Sec 28 relies on the sound premise that these
certain pre-election acts are still capable of being reasonably performed
vis-à-vis the remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of
other related pre-election activities required under the law. COMELEC has
stressed that there is an operational impossibility in conducting the
special registration such as the additional printing of the official ballots,
election returns and other forms and paraphernalia. Undergoing the long process
of preparing for the elections would result in the postponement of the
elections to June 10.
4. It is an accepted doctrine in
administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the
operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight
considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and
functions, in the best position to know what they can possibly do or not do,
under prevailing circumstances.
5. The law does not require that the
impossible be done. There is no obligation to do an impossible thing.
6. COMELEC, in denying the request of
petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and
confines of the applicable law on the matter. It merely exercised a prerogative
that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper
sphere of its constitutionally –mandated powers.
X. Powers of the
COMELEC
Ambil v. COMELEC
G.R. No.
143398 (October 25, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern Samar during the May 11, 1998
elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly
elected Governor. Private respondent
filed an election protest with the COMELEC, which was assigned to the First
Division.
Commissioner X prepared and signed a proposed resolution in
the case. Commissioner Y dissented, while Commissioner Z wanted to see both
positions first before giving her decision.
On 2/15/00, Commissioner X retired and was replaced. On 2/24/00, petitioner and respondent
received a purported resolution in favor of private respondent promulgated on
2/14/00 and signed by Commissioners X, Y, and Z. The First Division later declared that the
parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. The Division later set a date for
promulgation of a resolution of the case, and said that the aggrieved party
could then challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the
Commission en banc or through a certiorari case before the SC. The petitioner filed this case to annul the
order for the promulgation of the resolution and to direct the First Division
to deliberate anew on the case.
HELD: The SC dismissed the case for
prematurity. It ruled that it has no
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. “The instant case does
not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases
dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition.
In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the
Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner X as
void for various reasons. First, one who is no longer a member of the
Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot
validly take part in that resolution or decision. Second, the Clerk of the 1st
Division denied the release or promulgation of the resolution on 2/14/00
resolution. Third, the 1st Division even later said that the parties
should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. Lastly,
Commissioner Z could not have affixed her signature on the resolution, since on
the same date an order was issued where she said that she still wanted to see
both positions before making her decision.
Soller v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139853
(September 5, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both
candidates for mayor of the municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May
11, 1998 elections. The petitioner was
proclaimed as mayor by the municipal board of canvassers. Private respondent filed a petition with the
COMELEC to annul the proclamation.
Later, private respondent filed an election protest against petitioner
with the RTC. The COMELEC dismissed the
pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent, while the RTC denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but said
motion was denied.
Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC
a petition for certiorari contending
that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent's election
protest. The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's suit.
Petitioner now questions this decision of the COMELEC en banc.
HELD: The SC has ruled in previous cases that
the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does
not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including
pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to
the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases
decided by it in the first instance is null and void. In the SC’s view, the
authority to resolve petition for certiorari
involving incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned order of
the trial court, falls within the division of the COMELEC and not on the
COMELEC en banc.
Salva v. Makalintal
G.R. NO. 132603
(September 18, 2000)
FACTS: The petitioners filed with the RTC a
class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang
Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the COMELEC for annulment of Ordinance No. 05
and Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.
Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San
Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas
and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity
of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of
Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being
ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements
regarding the attestations or certifications of several government agencies
were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the
required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the
abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca,
Batangas.
The trial court denied the petition saying that any
petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC
must be brought before the Supreme Court.
The petitioners contend that when the COMELEC exercises its
quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, its
acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC
performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the
Regional Trial Court. Petitioners submit
that the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution
No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial
or administrative in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance
and Resolution.
HELD: The SC ruled that “…What is
contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those
rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by
the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for
the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was
not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an
incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order
reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
XI. Recall
Election
Afiado vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 141787
(September 18, 2000)
FACTS: The Preparatory Recall Assembly passed
Resolution No. 1 for the recall of Vice-Mayor Amelita Navarro. The issue is
whether an elective official who became City Mayor by legal succession can be
the subject of a recall election by virtue of a Preparatory Recall Assembly
Resolution that was passed when said elective official was still the
Vice-Mayor.
HELD: The assumption by legal succession of
the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City is a supervening event that
rendered the recall proceeding against her moot and academic. A perusal of the said Resolution reveals that
the person subject of the recall process is a specific elective official in
relation to her specific office.
Public
International Law
A. Extradition
Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez
G.R. No. 139465,
October 17, 2000
overturning 322 SCRA 160 (Jan.
18, 2000)
By virtue of an extradition treaty
between the US and the Philippines, the US requested for the extradition of
Mark Jimenez for violations of US tax and election laws. Pending evaluation of the extradition
documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for copies of the US'
extradition request. The Secetary of
Justice denied that request. ISSUE:
During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private
respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing?
HELD:
Private respondent is bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will
call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. The process of extradition does
not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in
the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Dissent (original
decision): Under
the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may be provisionally
arrested pending the submission of the request.
Because of this possible consequence, the evaluation process is akin to
an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, and partakes
of the nature of a criminal investigation.
Thus, the basic due process rights of notice and hearing are
indispensable.
Assuming that the extradition treaty
does not allow for such rights, the Constitutional right to procedural due
process must override treaty obligations.
When there is a conflict between international law obligations and the
Constitution, the Constitution must prevail.
B. Conflicts between international law
and Philippine law
Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez
322 SCRA 160 (Jan.
18, 2000)
The observance of our country's duties
under a treaty is compelled by, first, the principle of pacta sunt servanda (the obligation to keep their agreement in good
faith), and seond by the Constitution's doctrine of incorporation, as the
Constitution provides that the generally accepted principles of international
law form "part of the law of the land." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of
international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative
action id needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. Thus, a treaty obligation has the force and
effect of a statute, and is given equal treatment with the latter. The Constitution, as the Supreme law of the
Land, may invalidate a treaty inconsistent with it, as it does in case of an
unconstitutional statute. In the case of
a conflict between a treaty and a statute, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori applies—a
treaty may repeal a prior statute, and a later statute may repeal an existing
treaty.
C. Equal
protection under the Constitution and international law
International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing and
International School
G.R. No. 128845
(June 1, 2000)
International School (IS) pays its
teachers who are hired from abroad, or foreign-hires, a higher salary than its
local-hires, whether the latter are Filipino or not (most are Filipino, but
some are American). It justifies this
under the 'dislocation factor' – that foreigners must be given a higher salary
both to attract them to teach here, and to compensate them for the
"significant economic disadvantages" involved in coming here. The Teacher's Union cries discrimination.
Held: Discrimination
exists. Equal pay for equal work is a
principal long honored in this jurisdiction, as it rests on fundamental norms
of justice
1. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution
(Social Justice and Human Rights) exhorts Congress to give the highest priority
to the enactment of measures that protect and ennhance the right od all people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalitites." The Constitution
also provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work.".
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace, but include as
well the manner by which employers treat their employees. Lastly, the Constitution directs the State to
promote "equality of employment opportunities for all,"
"…regardless of sex, race, or creed."
It would be an affront to both the spirit and the letter of these
provisions if the State closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.
2. International law, which springs from
general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles
of equity, i.e., fairness and justice, based on the test of what is
reasonable. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and numerous other international Conventions all embody the
general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and
justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
D. Treaties
vs. Executive Agreements
Bayan v. Zamora
G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000
It is inconsequential whether the
United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. As long as
the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the
said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, is "an international instrument concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its
particular designation." There are many other terms used for a treaty or
international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis
d' arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact,
statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have
pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included under
the general term treaty have little or no legal significance. Article 2(2) of
the Vienna Convention provides that "the provisions of paragraph 1
regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to
the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to them in the
internal law of the State."
Thus, in international law, there is no difference
between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states
concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their
powers. International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and
executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations.
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized
the binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of the
Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of
Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, we said:". . . the right of the
Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days
of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects
as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements
and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously
questioned by our courts.”
