Revised Ortega Notes 2

DURATION OF PENALTIES

Reclusion Perpetua

What is the duration of reclusion perpetua?

Do not use Article 27 in answering this question. The proper answer would be that reclusion perpetua has no duration because it is an indivisible penalty and indivisible penalties have no duration.

Under Article 27, those sentenced to reclusion perpetua shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for 30 years, unless such person, by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon.

Under Article 70 (the Three-Fold Rule), the maximum period shall in no case exceed 40 years. If the convict who is to serve several sentences could only be made to serve 40 years, with more reason that one who is sentenced to a single penalty of reclusion perpetua should not serve for more than 40 years.

The duration of 40 years is not a matter of provision of law; this is only by analogy. There is no provision of the Revised Penal Code that one sentenced to reclusion perpetua cannot be held in jail for 40 years and neither is there a decision to this effect.

Destierro

What is the duration of destierro?

The duration of destierro is from 6 months and 1 year to 6 years, which is the same as that of prision correccional and suspension. Destierro is a principal penalty. It is a punishment whereby a convict is banished from a certain place and is prohibited from entering or coming near that place designated in the sentence for not less than 25 kilometers. However, the court cannot extend beyond 250 kms. If the convict should enter the prohibited places, he commits the crime of evasion of service of sentence under Article 157. But if the convict himself would go further from which he is banished by the court, there is no evasion of service of sentence because the 250km limit is upon the authority of the court in banishing the convict.

Under the Revised Penal Code, destierro is the penalty imposed in the following situations:

(1)  When a legally married person who had surprised his or her spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another and while in that act or immediately thereafter should kill or inflict serious physical injuries upon the other spouse, and/or the paramour or mistress. This is found in Article 247.

(2)  In the crimes of grave threats and/or light threats, when the offender is required to put up a bond for good behavior but failed or refused to do so under Article 248, such convict shall be sentenced with destierro so that he would not be able to carry out his threat.

(3)  In the crime of concubinage, the penalty prescribed for the concubine is destierro under Article 334.

(4)  Where the penalty prescribed by law is arresto mayor, but the offender is entitled to privileged mitigating circumstances and, lowering the prescribed penalty by one degree, the penalty becomes destierro. Thus it shall be the one imposed.

Civil Interdiction

Civil interdiction is an accessory penalty. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence:

(1)  The rights of parental authority, or guardianship either as to the person or property of any ward;

(2)  Marital authority;

(3)  The right to manage his property; and

(4)  The right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.

Can a convict execute a last will and testament? YES.

 

 

 

 

PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES

Principal penalties and accessory penalties

The penalties which are both principal and accessory penalties are the following:

(1)  Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification;

(2)  Perpetual or temporary special disqualification.

 

1.         If the penalty of suspension is imposed as an accessory, what is the duration?

Its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

2.         If the penalty of temporary disqualification is imposed as a principal penalty, what is the duration?

The duration is six years and one day to 12 years.

3.         What do we refer to if it is perpetual or temporary disqualification?

We refer to the duration of the disqualification.

4.         What do we refer to if it is special or absolute disqualification?

We refer to the nature of the disqualification.

The classification of principal and accessory is found in Article 25.

In classifying the penalties as principal and accessory, what is meant by this is that those penalties classified as accessory penalties need not be stated in the sentence. The accessory penalties follow the principal penalty imposed for the crime as a matter of course. So in the imposition of the sentence, the court will specify only the principal penalty but that is not the only penalty which the offender will suffer. Penalties which the law considers as accessory to the prescribed penalty are automatically imposed even though they are not stated in the judgment. As to the particular penalties that follow a particular principal penalty, Articles 40 to 45 of the Revised Penal Code shall govern.

If asked what are the accessory penalties, do not just state the accessory penalties. State the principal penalty and the corresponding accessory penalties.

Penalties in which other accessory penalties are inherent:

(1)  Article 40. Death—perpetual absolute disqualification, and civil interdiction during 30 years following date of sentence;

(2)  Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal—civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence, as the case may be, and perpetual absolute disqualification;

(3)  Art. 42. Prision mayor—temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage;

(4)  Art. 43. Prision correccional—suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage if the duration of the imprisonment shall exceed 18 months;

(5)  Art. 44. Arresto—suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

There are accessory penalties which are true to other principal penalties. An example is the penalty of civil interdiction. This is accessory penalty, and, as provided in Article 34, a convict sentenced to civil interdiction suffers certain disqualification during the term of the sentence. One of the disqualifications is that of making conveyance of his property inter vivos.

Illustration:

A has been convicted and is serving the penalty of prision mayor. While serving sentence, he executed a deed of sale over his only parcel of land. A creditor moved to annul the sale on the ground that the convict is not qualified to execute a deed of conveyance inter vivos. If you were the judge, how would you resolve the move of the creditor to annul the sale?

Civil interdiction is not an accessory penalty in prision mayor. The convict can convey his property.

 

         

What accessory penalty is common to all principal penalties?

Confiscation or forfeiture of the instrument of the proceeds of the crime.

Bond to keep the peace

One of the principal penalties common to the others is bond to keep the peace. There is no crime under the Revised Penal Code which carries this penalty.

Bond for good behavior

Bond for good behavior is prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the crimes of grave threats and light threats under Article 234. You cannot find this penalty in Article 25 because Article 25 provides for bond to keep the peace. Remember that no felony shall be punished by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission pursuant to Article 21.

 

         

Is the bond to keep the peace the same as bond for good behavior?

No. The legal effect of each is entirely different. The legal effect of a failure to post a bond to keep the peace is imprisonment either for 30 days or 6 months, depending on whether the felony committed is grave or less grave on the one hand, or it is light only on the other hand. The legal effect of failure to post a bond for good behavior is not imprisonment but destierro under Article 284.

Divisible and Indivisible Penalties

When we talk of period, it is implying that the penalty is divisible.

If, after being given a problem, you were asked to state the period in which the penalty of reclusion perpetua is to be imposed, remember that when the penalty is indivisible, there is no period. Do not talk of period, because when you talk of period, you are implying that the penalty is divisible since the period referred to is the minimum, medium and maximum. If it is indivisible, there is no such thing as a minimum, medium, or maximum period.

The capital punishment

You were asked to state whether you are in favor or against capital punishment. Understand that you are not taking an examination in Theology. Explain the issue on the basis of social utility of the penalty. Is it beneficial in deterring crimes or not? This should be the premise of your reasoning.

Designation of penalty

Since the principal penalties carry with them certain accessory penalties, the courts are not at liberty to use any designation of the principal penalty. So it was held that when the penalty should be reclusion perpetua, it is erroneous for the court to use “life imprisonment”. In other words, the courts are not correct when they deviate from the technical designation of the principal penalty, because the moment they deviate from this designation, there will be no accessory penalties that will go with them.

Reclusion perpetua as modified

Before the enactment of Republic Act 7659, which made amendments to the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua had no fixed duration. The Revised Penal Code provides in Article 27 that the convict shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for 30 years, unless by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he is not deserving of pardon. As amended by Section 21 of RA 7659, the same article now provides that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from 20 to 40 years. Because of this, speculations arose as to whether it made reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty.

As we know, when a penalty has a fixed duration, it is said to be divisible and, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 65 and 76, should be divided into three equal portions to form one period of each of the three portions. Otherwise, if the penalty has no fixed duration, it is an indivisible penalty. The nature of the penalty as divisible or indivisible is decisive of the proper penalty to be imposed under the Revised Penal Code inasmuch as it determines whether the rules in Article 63 or the rules in Article 64 should be observed in fixing the penalty.

Thus, consistent with the rule mentioned, the Supreme Court, by its First Division, applied Article 65 of the Code in imposing the penalty for rape in People v. Conrado Lucas, GR No. 108172-73, May 25, 1994. It divided the time included in the penalty of reclusion perpetua into three equal portions composing a period as follows:

Minimum—20 years and one day to 26 years and eight months;

Medium—26 years, eight months and one day to 33 years and four months;

Maximum—34 years, four months and one day to 40 years.

Considering the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the Court sentenced the accused to imprisonment of 34 years, four months and one day of reclusion perpetua, instead of the straight penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court. The appellee seasonably filed a motion for clarification to correct the duration of the sentence, because instead of beginning with 33 years, four months and one day, it began with 34 years, four months and one day. The issue of whether the amendment of Article 27 made reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty was raised, and because the issue is one of first impression and momentous importance, the First Division referred the motion to the Court en banc.

In a resolution promulgated on January 5, 1995, the Supreme Court en banc held that reclusion perpetua shall remain as an indivisible penalty. To this end, the resolution states:

After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislation history of RA 7659, the Court concludes that although Section 17 of RA 7659 has fixed the duration of Reclusion Perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty.

Verily, if reclusion perpetua was classified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis of existence. To illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the amended RA No. 6425 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever the dangerous drugs involved are of any of the quantities stated herein. If Article 63 of the Code were no longer applicable because reclusion perpetua is supposed to be a divisible penalty, then there would be no statutory rules for determining when either reclusion perpetua or death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be no occasion for imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug cases, regardless of the attendant modifying circumstances.

Now then, if Congress had intended to reclassify reclusion perpetua as divisible penalty, then it should have amended Article 63 and Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code. The latter is the law on what are considered divisible penalties under the Code and what should be the duration of the periods thereof. There are, as well, other provisions of the RPC involving reclusion perpetua, such as Art 41 on the accessory penalties thereof and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Art 61, which has not been touched by the corresponding amendment.

Ultimately, the question arises: “What then may be the reason for the amendment fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua?” This question was answered in the same case of People v. Lucas by quoting pertinent portion of the decision in People v. Reyes, 212 SCRA 402, thus:

The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, thereof, is only to serve as the basis for determining the convict’s eligibility for pardon or the application of the three-fold rule in the service of penalties. Since, however, in all the graduated scales of penalties in the Code, as set out in Article 25, 70 and 21, reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately next higher to reclusion temporal, it follows by necessary implication that the minimum of reclusion perpetua is  twenty (20) years and one (1) day with a maximum duration thereafter to last for the rest of the convict’s natural life, although pursuant to Article 70 , it appears that the maximum period for the service of the penalties shall not exceed forty (40) years. It would be legally absurd and violative of the scales of penalties in the Code to reckon the minimum of Reclusion Perpetua at thirty (30) years since there would thereby be a resultant lacuna whenever the penalty exceeds the maximum twenty (20) years of Reclusion Temporal but is less than thirty (30) years.

Innovations in the imposition of the death penalty

Aside from restoring the death penalty for certain heinous crimes, Republic Act No. 7659 and Republic Act No. 8177 made innovations on the provisions of RPC regarding the imposition of the death penalty:

(1)   Article 47 (amended by R.A. No. 7659) has been reworded to expressly include among the instances where the death penalty shall not be imposed, the case of an offender who is below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. But even without this amendment, the death penalty may not be meted out on an offender who was below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime because Article 68 lowers the imposable penalty upon such offenders by at least one degree than that prescribed for the crime.

(2)   In the matter of executing the death penalty, Article 81 has been amended by R.A. No. 81 and, thus, directs that the manner of putting the convict to death shall be by lethal injection (formerly electrocution then gas poisoning), and the sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one (1) year but not later than eighteen (18) months after the finality of judgment.

(3)   The original provision of Article 83, anent the suspension of the execution of the death penalty for three years if the convict was a woman, has been deleted and instead, limits such suspension to last while the woman was pregnant and within one year after delivery.

 

The death penalty cannot be inflicted under which of the following circumstances?

1.     When the guilty person in at least 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime.

2.     When the guilty person is more than 70 years of age.

3.     When, upon appeal or automatic review by the Supreme Court, the required majority for the imposition of the death penalty is not obtained.

4.     When the person is convicted of a capital crime but before executin becomes insane.

5.     When the accused is a woman while she is pregnant or within one year after delivery.

Explain your answer and choice briefly.

A (Suggested): Understanding the word “inflicted” to mean the imposition of death penalty, not its execution, the circumstance in which the death penalty cannot be inflicted is no.2: “when the guilty person is more than 70 years of age” (Art. 47, Revised Penal Code). Instead, the penalty shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40, RPC.

In circumstance no.1 when the guilty person is at least 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, the death penalty can be imposed since the offender is already of legal age when he committed the crime.

Circumstance no. 3 no longer operates, considering the decision of the Supreme Court in People v. Efren Mateo (G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004) providing an intermediate review for such cases where the penalty imposed us death, reclusión perpetua or life imprisonment before they are elevated to the Supreme Court.

In circumstances no. 4 & 5, the death penalty can be imposed if prescribed by the law violated although its execution shall be suspended when the convict becomes insane before it could be executed and while he is insane.

Likewise, the death penalty can be imposed upon a woman but its execution shall be suspended during her pregnancy and for one year after her delivery.

A (Alternative): The word “INFLICTED” is found only in Art. 83 to the effect that the death penalty may not be “INFLICTED” upon a pregnant woman, such penalty is to be suspended.

If “INFLICTED” is to be construed as “EXECUTION,” then No.5 is the choice.

Subsidiary penalty

Is subsidiary penalty an accessory penalty?

No.

If  the convict does not want to pay a fine and has so many friends and wants to prolong his stay in jail, can he stay there and not pay the fine? No.

After undergoing subsidiary penalty and convict is already released from the jail and his financial circumstances improve, can he made to pay? Yes, for the full amount with deduction.

Article 39 deals with subsidiary penalty. There are two situations there:

(1)   When there is a penalty of imprisonment or any other principal penalty and it carries with it a fine; and

(2)   When penalty is only a fine.

Therefore, there shall be no subsidiary penalty for the non-payment of damages to the offended party.

This subsidiary penalty is one of important matter under the title of penalty. A subsidiary penalty in not an accessory penalty. Since it is not an accessory penalty, it must be expressly stated in the sentence, but the sentence does not specify the period of subsidiary penalty because it will only be known if the convict cannot pay the fine. The sentence will merely provide that in case of non-payment of fine, the convict shall be required to serve subsidiary penalty. It will then be the prison authority who will compute this.

So even if subsidiary penalty is proper in a case, if the judge failed to state in the sentence that the convict shall be required to suffer subsidiary penalty in case of insolvency to pay the fine, that convict cannot be required to suffer the accessory penalty. This particular legal point is a bar problem. Therefore, the judgment of the court must state this. If the judgment is silent, he cannot suffer any subsidiary penalty.

The subsidiary penalty is not an accessory penalty that follows the principal penalty as a matter of course. It is not within the control of the convict to pay the fine or not and once the sentence becomes final and executory and a writ of execution is issued to collect the fine, if the convict has a property to levy upon, the same shall answer for the fine, whether he likes it or not. It must be that the convict is insolvent to pay the fine. That means that the writ of execution issued against the property of the convict, if any, is returned unsatisfied.

In People v. Subido, it was held that the convict cannot choose not to serve, or not to pay the fine and instead serve the subsidiary penalty. A subsidiary penalty will only be served if the sheriff should return the execution for the fine on the property of the convict and does not have the properties to satisfy the writ.

 

The penalty imposed by the judge is fine only. The sheriff then tried to levy the property of the defendant after it has become final and executory, but it was returned unsatisfied. The court then issued an order for said convict to suffer the subsidiary penalty. The convict was detained, for which reason he filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that his detention is illegal. Will the petition prosper?

Yes. The judgment became final without statement as to subsidiary penalty, so that even if the convict has no money or property to satisfy the fine, he cannot suffer subsidiary penalty because the latter is not an accessory and so it must be expressly stated. If the court overlooked to provide for subsidiary penalty in the sentence and its attention was later called to that effect, thereafter, it tried to modify the sentence to include subsidiary penalty after period to appeal had already elapsed, the addition of subsidiary penalty will be null and void. This is tantamount to double jeopardy.

If the fine is prescribed with the penalty of imprisonment or any deprivation of liberty, such imprisonment should not be higher than six years or prision correccional. Otherwise, there is no subsidiary penalty.

When is subsidiary penalty applied

(1)   If the subsidiary penalty prescribed for the non-payment of the which goes with the principal penalty, the maximum duration of the subsidiary penalty is one year, so there is no subsidiary that goes beyond one year.  But this will only be true if the one year period is higher than 1/3 of the principal penalty, the convict cannot be made to undergo subsidiary penalty more than 1/3 of the duration of the principal penalty and in no case will it be more than 1 year – get 1/3 of the principal penalty – whichever is lower.

(2)   If the subsidiary penalty is to be imposed for non payment of fine and the principal penalty imposed be fine only, which is a single penalty, that means it does not go with another principal penalty, the most that the convict will be required to undergo subsidiary imprisonment is six months, if the felony committed is grave or less grave, otherwise, if the felony committed is slight, the maximum duration of the subsidiary penalty is only 15 days.

There are some who use the term subsidiary imprisonment.  The term is wrong because the penalty is not only served by imprisonment.  The subsidiary penalty follows the nature of the principal penalty.  If the principal penalty is destierro, this being a divisible penalty, and a penalty with a fixed duration, the non-payment of the fine will bring about subsidiary penalty.  This being a restriction of liberty with a fixed duration under Article 39 for the nonpayment of fine that goes with the destierro, the convict will be required to undergo subsidiary penalty and it will also be in the form of destierro.

Illustration:

A convict was sentenced to suspension and fine.  This is a penalty where a public officer anticipates public duties, he entered into the performance of public office even before he has complied with the required to undergo subsidiary penalty?

Yes, because the penalty of suspension has a fixed duration.  Under Article 27, suspension and destierro have the same duration as prision correccional.  So the duration does not exceed six years.  Since it is a penalty with a fixed duration under Article 39, when there is a subsidiary penalty, such shall be 1/3 of the period of suspension which in no case beyond one year.  But the subsidiary penalty will be served not by imprisonment but by continued suspension.

If the penalty is public censure and fine even if the public censure is a light penalty, the convict cannot be required to pay the fine for subsidiary penalty for the non-p0ayment of the fine because public censure is a penalty that has no fixed duration.

Do not consider the totality of the imprisonment the convict is sentenced to but consider the totality or the duration of the imprisonment that the convict will be required to serve under the Three-Fold Rule.  If the totality of the imprisonment under this rule does not exceed six years, then, even if the totality of all the sentences without applying the Three-Fold Rule will go beyond six years, the convict shall be required to undergo subsidiary penalty if he could not pay the fine.

Illustration:

A collector of NAWASA collected from 50 houses within a certain locality.  When he was collecting NAWASA bills, the charges of all these consumers was a minimum of 10.  The collector appropriated the amount collected and so was charged with estafa.  He was convicted.  Penalty imposed was arresto mayor and a fine of P200.00 in each count.  If you were the judge, what penalty would you impose?  May the convict be required to undergo subsidiary penalty in case he is insolvent to pay the fine?

The Three-Fold Rule should not applied by the court.  In this case of 50 counts of estafa, the penalty imposed was arresto mayor and a fie of P200.00.  Arresto mayor + P200.00 x 50.  Arresto Mayor is six months x 50 = 25 years.  P200.00 x 50 = P10,000.00.  Thus, I would impose a penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of P200.00 multiplied by 50 counts and state further that “as a judge, I am not in the position to apply the Three-Fold Rule because the Three-Fold Rule is to be given effect when the convict is already serving sentence in the penitentiary.  It is the prison authority who will apply the Three-Fold Rule.  As far as the court is concerned, that will be the penalty to be imposed.”

For the purposes of subsidiary penalty, apply the Three-Fold Rule if the penalty is arresto mayor and a fine of P200.00 multiplied by 3.  This means one year and six months only.  So, applying the Three-Fold Rule, the penalty does not go beyond six years.  Hence, for the non-payment of the fine of P10,000.00, the convict shall be required to undergo subsidiary penalty.  This is because the imprisonment that will be served will not go beyond six years.  It will only be one year and six months, since in the service of the sentence, the Three-Fold Rule will apply.

It is clearly provided under Article 39 that if the means of the convict should improve, even if he has already served subsidiary penalty, he shall still be required to pay the fine and there is no deduction for that amount which the convict has already served by way of subsidiary penalty.

Articles 63 and 64

If crime committed is parricide, penalty is reclusion perpetua.  The accused, after committing parricide, voluntarily surrendered and pleaded guilty of the crime charged upon arraignment.  It was also established that he was intoxicated, and no aggravating circumstances were present.  What penalty would you impose?

Reclusion perpetua, because it is an indivisible penalty.

When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, penalty to be imposed shall be one degree lower to be imposed in the proper period.  Do not apply this when there is one aggravating circumstance.

Illustration:

There are about four mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance.  Court offsets the aggravating circumstance against the mitigating circumstance and there still remains three mitigating circumstances.  Because of that, the judge lowered the penalty by one degree.  Is the judge correct?

No.  In such a case when there are aggravating circumstances, no matter how many mitigating circumstances there are, after offsetting, do not go down any degree lower.  The penalty prescribed by law will be the penalty to be imposed, but in the minimum period.  Cannot go below the minimum period when there is an aggravating circumstance.

Go into the lowering of the penalty by one degree if the penalty is divisible.  So do not apply the rule in paragraph 5 of Article 64 to a case where the penalty is divisible.

Article 66

When there are mitigating circumstance and aggravating circumstance and the penalty is only fine, when it is only ordinary mitigating circumstance and aggravating circumstance, apply Article 66.  Because you determine the imposable fine on the basis of the financial resources or means of the offender.  But if the penalty would be lowered by degree, there is a privileged mitigating circumstance or the felony committed is attempted or frustrated, provided it is not a light felony against persons or property, because if it is a light felony and punishable by fine, it is not a crime at all unless it is consummated.  So, if it is attempted or frustrated, do not go one degree lower because it is not punishable unless it is a light felony against person or property where the imposable penalty will be lowered by one degree or two degrees.

Penalty prescribed to a crime is lowered by degrees in the following cases:

(1)  When the crime is only attempted or frustrated.

      If it is frustrated, penalty is one degree lower than that prescribed by law.

      If it is attempted, penalty is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law.

His is so because the penalty prescribed by law for a crime refers to the consummated stage.

(2)  When the offender is an accomplice or accessory only

Penalty is one degree lower in the case of an accomplice.

Penalty is two degrees lower in the case of an accessory.

This is so because the penalty prescribed by law for a given crime refers to the consummated stage.

(3)  When there is a privilege mitigating circumstance in favor of the offender, it will lower the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law depending on what the particular provision of the Revised Penal Code states.

(4)  When the penalty prescribed for the crime committed is a divisible penalty and there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances whatsoever, the penalty next lower in degree shall be the one imposed.

(5)  Whenever the provision of the Revised Penal Code specifically lowers the penalty by one or two degrees than what is ordinarily prescribed for the crime committed.

Penalty commonly imposed by the Revised Penal Code may be by way of imprisonment or by way of fine or, to a limited extent, by way6 of destierro or disqualification, whether absolute or special.

In the matter of lowering the penalty by degree, the reference is Article 71.  It is necessary to know the chronology under Article 71 by simply knowing the scale.  Take note that destierro comes after arresto mayor so the penalty one degree lower than arresto mayor is not arresto menor, but destierro.  Memorize the scale in Article 71.

In Article 37, with respect to the range of each penalty, the range of arresto menor follows arresto mayor, since arresto menor is one to 30 days or one month, while arresto mayor is one month and one day to six months.  On the other hand, the duration of destierro is the same as prision correccional which is six months and one day to six years.  But be this as it is, under Article 71, in the scale of penalties graduated according to degrees, arresto mayor is higher than diestierro.

In homicide under Article 249, the penalty is reclusion temporal.  One degree lower, if homicide is frustrated, or there is an accomplice participating in homicide, is prision mayor, and two degrees lower is prision correccional.

This is true if the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is a whole divisible penalty – one degree or 2 degrees lower will also be punished as a whole.  But generally, the penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal Code are only in periods, like prision correccional minimum, or prision correccional minimum to medium.

Although the penalty is prescribed by the Revised Penal Code as a period, such penalty should be understood as a degree in itself and the following rules shall govern:

(1)   When the penalty prescribed by the Reised Code is made up of a period, like prision correccional medium, the penalty one degree lower is prision correccional minimum, and the penalty two degrees lower is arresto mayor maximum.  In other words, each degree will be made up of only one period because the penalty prescribed is also made up only of one period.

(2)   When the penalty prescribed by the Code is made up of two periods of a given penalty, every time such penalty is lowered by one degree you have to go down also by two periods.

Illustration:

If the penalty prescribed for the crime is prision correccional medium to maximum, the penalty one degree lower will be arresto mayor maximum  to prision correccional minimum, and the penalty another degree lower will be arresto mayor minimum to medium.  Every degree will be composed of two periods.

(3)   When the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is made up fo three periods of different penalties, every time you go down one degree lower, you have to go down by three periods.

Illustration:

The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium, the penalty one degree lower is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.  Another degree lower will be arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium.

These rules have nothing to do with mitigating or aggravating circumstances.  These rules refer to the lowering of penalty by one or two degrees.  As to how mitigating or aggravating circumstances may affect the penalty, the rules are found in Articles 63 and 64.  Article 63 governs when the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is divisible.  When the penalty is indivisible, no matter how many ordinary mitigating circumstances there are, the prescribed penalty is never lowered by degree.  It takes a privileged mitigating circumstance to lower such penalty by degree.  On the other hand, when the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is divisible, such penalty shall be lowered by one degree only but imposed in the proper period, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance whatsoever.

Article 75 - Fines

With respect to the penalty of fine, if the fine

 has to be lowered by degree either because the felony committed is only attempted or frustrated or because there is an accomplice or an accessory participation, the fine is lowered by deducting ¼ of the maximum amount of the fine from such maximum without changing the minimum amount prescribed by law.

Illustration:

If  the penalty prescribed is a fine ranging from P200.00 to P500.00, but the felony is frustrated so that the penalty should be imposed one degree lower, ¼ of P500.00, shall be deducted therefrom.  This is done by deducting P125.00 from P500.00, leaving a difference of P375.00.  The penalty one degree lower is P375.00.  To go another degree lower, P125.00 shall again be deducted from P375.00 and that would leave a difference of P250.00.  Hence, the penalty another degree lower is a fine ranging from P200.00 to P250.00.  If at all, the fine has to be lowered further, it cannot go lower than P200.00.  So, the fine will be imposed at P200.00.  This rule applies when the fine has to be lowered by degree.

Article 66

In so far as ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstance would affect the penalty which is in the form of a fine, Article 66 of the Revised Penal Code shall govern.  Under this article, it is discretionary upon the court to apply the fine taking into consideration the financial means of the offender to pay the same.  In other words, it is not only the mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances that the court shall take into consideration, but primarily, the financial capability of the offender to pay the fine.  For the same crime, the penalty upon an accused who I poor may be less than the penalty upon an accused committing the same crime but who is wealthy.

For instance, when there are two offenders who are co-conspirators to a crime, and their penalty consists of a fine only, and one of them is wealthy while the other is a pauper, the court may impose a higher penalty upon the wealthy person and a lower fine for the pauper.

Penalty for murder under the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal maximum to death.  So, the penalty would be reclusion temporal maximum – reclusion perpetua – death.  This penalty made up of three periods.

The Three-Fold Rule

Under this rule, when a convict is to serve successive penalties, he will not actually serve the penalties imposed by law.  Instead, the most severe of the penalties imposed on him shall be multiplied by three and the period will be the only term of the penalty to be served by him.  However, in no case should the penalty exceed 40 years.

This rule is intended for the benefit of the convict and so, you will only apply this provided the sum total of all the penalties imposed would be greater than the product of the most severe penalty multiplied by three but in no case will the penalties to be served by the convict be more than 40 years.

Although this rule is known as the Three-Fold Rule, you cannot actually apply this if the convict is to serve only three successive penalties.  The Three-Fold Rule can only be applied if the convict I to serve four or more sentences successively.  If the sentences would be served simultaneously, the Three-Fold Rule does not govern.

The chronology of the penalties as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be followed.

It is in the service of the penalty, not in the imposition of the penalty, that the Three-Fold Rule is to be applied.  The Three-Fold Rule will apply whether the sentences are the product of one information in one court, whether the sentences are promulgated in one day or whether the sentences are promulgated by different courts on different days.  What is material is that the convict shall serve more than three successive sentences.

For purposes of the Three-fold Rule, even perpetual penalties are taken into account.  So not only penalties with fixed duration, even penalties without any fixed duration or indivisible penalties are taken into account.  For purposes of the Three-Fold Rule, indivisible penalties are given equivalent of 30 years.  If the penalty is perpetual disqualification, it will be given and equivalent duration of 30 years, so that if he will have to suffer several perpetual disqualification, under the Three-Fold Rule, you take the most severe and multiply it by three.  The Three-Fold Rule does not apply to the penalty prescribed but to the penalty imposed as determined by the court.

Illustration:

Penalties imposed are –

One prision correccional – minimum –   2 years

                                                and 4 months

One arresto mayor  –   1 month and 1 day to 6

                                                          months

One prision mayor  –    6 years and 1 day to 12

  years

Do not commit the mistake of applying the Three-Fold Rule in this case.  Never apply the Three-Fold Rule when there are only three sentences.  Even if you add the penalties, you can never arrive at a sum higher than the product of the most severe multiplied by three.

The common mistake is, if given a situation, whether the Three-Fold Rule could be applied.  If asked, if you were the judge, what penalty would you impose, for purposes of imposing the penalty, the court is not at liberty to apply the Three-Fold Rule, whatever the sum total of penalty for each crime committed, even if it would amount to 1,000 years or more.  It is only when the convict is serving sentence that the prison authorities should determine how long he should stay in jail.

Illustration:

A distinct engineer was sentenced by the court to a term of 914 years in prison.

A person was sentenced to three death sentences.  Significance:  If ever granted pardon for 1 crime, the two remaining penalties must still be executed.

This rule will apply only if sentences are to be served successively.

ACT NO. 4013 (INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW), AS AMENDED

Three things to know about the Indeterminate Sentence Law:

(1)  Its purpose;

(2)  Instances when it does not apply; and

(3)  How it operates

Indeterminate Sentence Law governs whether the crime is punishable under the Revised Penal Code or a special Law.  It is not limited to violations of the Revised Penal Code.

It applies only when the penalty served is imprisonment.  If not by imprisonment, then it does not apply.

Purpose

The purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence

law is to avoid prolonged imprisonment, because it is proven to be more destructive than constructive to the offender.  So, the purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in shortening the possible detention of the convict in jail is to save valuable human resources.  I other words, if the valuable human resources were allowed prolonged confinement in jail, they would deteriorate.  Purpose is to preserve economic usefulness for these people for having committed a crime – to reform them rather than to deteriorate them and, at the same time, saving the government expenses of maintaining the convicts on a prolonged confinement in jail.

If the crime is a violation of the Revised Penal Code, the court will impose a sentence that has a minimum and maximum.  The maximum of the indeterminate sentence will be arrived at by taking into account the attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances according to Article 64 of the Revised penal Code.  In arriving at the minimum of the indeterminate sentence, the court will take into account the penalty prescribed for the crime and go one degree lower.  Within the range of one degree lower, the court will fix the minimum for the indeterminate sentence, and within the range of the penalty arrived at as the maximum in the indeterminate sentence, the court will fix the maximum of the sentence.  If there is a privilege mitigating circumstance which has been taken in consideration in fixing the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, the minimum shall be based on the penalty as reduced by the privilege mitigating circumstance within the range of the penalty next lower in degree.

If the crime is a violation of a special law, in fixing the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, the court will impose the penalty within the range of the penalty prescribed by the special law, as long as it will not exceed the limit of the penalty.  In fixing the minimum, the court can fix a penalty anywhere within the range of penalty prescribed by the special law, as long as it will not be less than the minimum limit of the penalty under said law.  No mitigating and aggravating circumstances are taken into account.

The minimum and the maximum referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Law are not periods.  So, do not say, maximum or minimum period.  For the purposes of the indeterminate Sentence Law, use the term minimum to refer to the duration of the sentence which the convict shall serve as a minimum, and when we say maximum, for purposes of ISLAW, we refer to the maximum limit of the duration that the convict may be held in jail.  We are not referring to any period of the penalty as enumerated in Article 71.

Courts are required to fix a minimum and a maximum of the sentence that they are to impose upon an offender when found guilty of the crime charged.  So, whenever the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable, there is always a minimum and maximum of the sentence that the convict shall serve.  If the crime is punished by the Revised Penal Code, the law provides that the maximum shall be arrived at by considering the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime according to the proper rules of the Revised Penal Code.  To fix the maximum, consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances according to the rules found in Article 64.  This means –

(1)  Penalties prescribed by the law for the crime committed shall be imposed in the medium period if no mitigating or aggravating circumstance;

(2)  If there is aggravating circumstance, no mitigating, penalty shall be imposed in the maximum;

(3)  If there is mitigating circumstance, no aggravating, penalty shall be in the minimum;

(4)  If there are several mitigating and aggravating circumstances, they shall offset against each other.  Whatever remains, apply the rules.

(5)  If there are two or more mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, penalty next lower in degree shall be the one imposed.

Rule under Art 64 shall apply in determining the maximum but not in determining the minimum.

In determining the applicable penalty according to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there is no need to mention the number of years, months and days; it is enough that the name of the penalty is mentioned while the Indeterminate Sentence Law.  The attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime are taken into consideration only when the maximum of the penalty is to be fixed.  But in so far as the minimum is concerned, the basis of the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, and go one degree lower than that.  But penalty one degree lower shall be applied in the same manner that the maximum is also fixed based only on ordinary mitigating circumstances.  This is true only if the mitigating circumstance taken into account is only an ordinary mitigating circumstance.  If the mitigating circumstance is privileged, you cannot follow the law in so far as fixing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is concerned; otherwise, it may happen that the maximum of the indeterminate sentence is lower than its minimum.

In one Supreme Court ruling, it was held that for purposes of applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code and not that which may be imposed by court.  This ruling, however, is obviously erroneous.  This is so because such an interpretation runs contrary to the rule of pro reo, which provides that the penal laws should always be construed an applied in a manner liberal or lenient to the offender.  Therefore, the rule is, in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is that penalty arrived at by the court after applying the mitigating and aggravating circumstances that should be the basis.

Crimes punished under special law carry only one penalty; there are no degree or periods.  Moreover, crimes under special law do not consider mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime.  So in the case of statutory offense, no mitigating and no aggravating circumstances will be taken into account.  Just the same, courts are required in imposing the penalty upon the offender to fix a minimum that the convict should serve, and to set a maximum as the limit of that sentence.  Under the law, when the crime is punished under a special law, the court may fix any penalty as the maximum without exceeding the penalty prescribed by special law for the crime committed.  In the same manner, courts are given discretion to fix a minimum anywhere within the range of the penalty prescribed by special law, as long as it will not be lower than the penalty prescribed.

Disqualification may be divided into three, according to –

(1)  The time  committed;

(2)  The penalty imposed; and

(3)  The offender involved.

 

Q: When would the Indeterminate Sentence Law be inapplicable?

A: The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not inapplicable to:

(1)  Persons convicted of offense punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment;

(2)  Persons convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;

(3)  Persons convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, espionage;

(4)  Persons convicted of piracy;

(5)  Persons who are habitual delinquents;

(6)  Persons who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;

(7)  Those who have been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive and shall have violated the term thereto;

(8)  Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year;

(9) Those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of the approval of Indeterminate Sentence Law;

(10) Those whose sentence imposes penalties which do not involve imprisonment, like destierro;

Reclusion perpetua is equated to life imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. There the said law will be inapplicable to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty (People v. Enriquez, Jr.). 

Although the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is death or reclusion perpetua, if after considering the attendant circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal or less, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies (People v. Cempron, 187 SCRA 278).

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968 (PROBATION LAW)

Among the different grounds of partial extinction of criminal liability, the most important is probation.  Probation is a manner of disposing of an accused who have been convicted by a trial court by placing him under supervision of a probation officer, under such terms and conditions that the court may fix.  This may be availed of before the convict begins serving sentence by final judgment and provided that he did not appeal anymore from conviction.

Without regard to the nature of the crime, only those whose penalty does not exceed six years of imprisonment are those qualified for probation.  If the penalty is six years plus one day, he is no longer qualified for probation.

If the offender was convicted of several offenses which were tried jointly and one decision was rendered where multiple sentences imposed several prison terms as penalty, the basis for determining whether the penalty disqualifies the offender from probation or not is the term of the individual imprisonment and not the totality of all the prison terms imposed in the decision.  So even if the prison term would sum up to more than six years, if none of the individual penalties exceeds six years, the offender is not disqualified by such penalty from applying for probation.

On the other hand, without regard to the penalty, those who are convicted of subversion or any crime against the public order are not qualified for probation.  So know the crimes under Title III, Book 2 of the Revised Penal code.  Among these crimes is Alarms and Scandals, the penalty of which is only arresto menor or a fine.  Under the amendment to the Probation Law, those convicted of a crime against public order regardless of the penalty are not qualified for probation.

May a recidivist be given the benefit of Probation Law?

As a general rule, no.

Exception:  If the earlier conviction refers to a crime the penalty of which does not exceed 30 days imprisonment or a fine of not more than P200.000, such convict is not disqualified of the benefit of probation.  So even if he would be convicted subsequently of a crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code as that of the earlier conviction, he is not disqualified from probation provided that the penalty for the current crime committed does not go beyond six years and the nature of the crime committed by him is not against public order, national security or subversion (Sec.9, Probation Law).

Although a person may be eligible for probation, the moment he perfects an appeal from the judgment of conviction, he cannot avail of probation anymore.  So the benefit of probation must be invoked at the earliest instance after conviction.  He should not wait up to the time when he interposes an appeal or the sentence has become final and executory.  The idea is that probation has to be invoked at the earliest opportunity.

An application for probation is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the trial court that renders the judgment.  For the offender to apply in such court, he should not appeal such judgment.

If the offender would appeal the conviction of the trial court and the appellate court reduced the penalty to say, less than six years, that convict can still file an application for probation, because the earliest opportunity for him to avail of probation came only after judgment by the appellate court.

Whether a convict who is otherwise qualified for probation may be give the benefit of probation or not, the courts are always required to conduct a hearing.  If the court denied the application for probation without the benefit of the hearing, where as the applicant is not disqualified under the provision of the Probation Law, but only based on the report of the probation officer, the denial is correctible by certiorari, because it is an act of the court in excess of jurisdiction or without jurisdiction, the order denying the application therefore is null and void.

Probation is intended to promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment; to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; to prevent the commission of offenses; to decongest our jails; and to save the government much needed finance for maintaining convicts in jail.

Probation is only a privilege.  So even if the offender may not be disqualified of probation, yet the court believes that because of the crime committed it was not advisable to give probation because it would depreciate the effect of the crime, the court may refuse or deny an application for probation.

Moreover, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Section 24) expressly provides that “Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under the Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law.”

Consider not only the probationable crime, but also the probationable penalty.  If it were the non-probationable crime, then regardless of the penalty, the convict cannot avail of probation.  Generally, the penalty which is not probationable is any penalty exceeding six years of imprisonment.  Offenses which are not probationable are those against natural security, those against public order and those with reference to subversion.

Persons who have been granted of the benefit of probation cannot avail thereof for the second time.  Probation is only available once and this may be availed only where the convict starts serving sentence and provided he has not perfected an appeal.  If the convict perfected an appeal, he forfeits his right to apply for probation.  As far as offenders who are under preventive imprisonment, that because a crime committed is not bailable or the crime committed, although bailable, they cannot afford to put up a bail, upon promulgation of the sentence, naturally he goes back to detention, that does not mean that they already start serving the sentence even after promulgation of the sentence, sentence will only become final and executory after the lapse of the 15-day period, unless the convict has waived expressly his right to appeal or otherwise, he has partly started serving sentence and in that case, the penalty will already be final and executory, no right to probation can be applied for.

 

Q: Juan was convicted by the RTC of a crime and sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment for a minimum of eight years. He appealed both his conviction and the penalty imposed upon him to the CA. CA sustained his conviction but reduced his sentence to a max. of 4 years and 8 months. Could Juan forthwith file an application for probation? Explain.

A: No. Juan can no longer apply for probation because he appealed from the judgment of conviction of the trial court. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law mandates that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the accused has perfected an appeal from a judgment of conviction.

Probation shall be denied if the court finds:

(1)   That the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution;

(2)   That there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or

(3)   Probation will depreciate the seriousness of the crime.

The probation law imposes two kinds of conditions:

(1)   Mandatory conditions; and

(2)   Discretionary conditions.

Mandatory conditions:

(1)   The convict must report to the Probation Officer (PO) designated in the court order approving his application for Probation within 72 hours from receipt of Notice of such order approving his application; and

(2)   The convict, as a probationer, must report to the PO at least once a month during the period of probation unless sooner required by the PO.

These conditions being mandatory, the moment any of these is violate, the probation is cancelled.

Discretionary conditions:

The trial court which approved the application for probation may impose any condition which may be constructive to the correction of the offender, provided the same would not violate the constitutional rights of the offender and subject ot this two restrictions:  (1) the conditions imposed should not be unduly restrictive of the probationer, and (2) such condition should not be incompatible with the freedom of conscience of the probationer.

EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Always provide two classifications when answering this question.

Criminal liability is totally extinguished as follows:

(1)   By the death of the convict as to personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

(2)   By service of sentence;

(3)   By amnesty which completely extinguished the penalty and all its effects;

(4)   By absolute pardon;

(5)   By prescription of the crime;

(6)   By prescription of the penalty;

(7)   By the marriage of the offended women as in the crimes of rape, abduction, seduction and acts of lasciviousness.

Criminal liability is partially extinguished as follows:

(1)   By conditional pardon;

(2)   By commutation of sentence;

(3)   Fr good conduct, allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving sentence;

(4)   Parole; and

(5)   Probation.

Total extinction of criminal liability

Among the grounds for total extinction as well as those for partial extinction, you cannot find among them the election to public office.  In one case, a public official was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.  During the ensuing election, he was nevertheless re-elected by the constituents, one of the defenses raised was that of condonation of the crime by his constituents, that his constituents have pardoned him.  The Supreme Court ruled that the re-election to public office is not one of the grounds by which criminal liability is extinguished.  This is only true to administrative cases but not criminal cases.

Death of the offender

Where the offender dies before final judgment, his death extinguishes both his criminal and civil liabilities.  So while a case is on appeal, the offender dies, the case on appeal will be dismissed.  The offended party may file a separate civil action under the Civil Code if any other basis for recovery of civil liability exists as provided under Art 1157 Civil Code.  (People v. Bayotas, decided on September 2, 1994)

Amnesty and pardon

The effects of amnesty as well as absolute pardon are not the same.  Amnesty erases not only the conviction but also the crime itself.  So that if an offender was convicted for rebellion and he qualified for amnesty, and so he was given an amnesty, then years later he rebelled again and convicted, is he a recidivist?   No.  Because the amnesty granted to him erased not only the conviction but also the effects of the conviction itself.

Supposed, instead of amnesty, what was given was absolute pardon, then years later, the offended was again captured and charged for rebellion, he was convicted, is he a recidivist?  Yes.  Pardon, although absolute does not erase the effects of conviction.  Pardon only excuses the convict from serving the sentence.  There is an exception to this and that is when the pardon was granted when the convict had already served the sentence such that there is no more service of sentence to be executed then the pardon shall be understood as intended to erase the effects of the conviction.

So if the convict has already served the sentence and in spite of that he was given a pardon that pardon will cover the effects of the crime and therefore, if he will be subsequently convicted for a felony embracing the same title as that crime, he cannot be considered a recidivist, because the pardon wipes out the effects of the crime.

But if he was serving sentence when he was pardoned, that pardon will not wipe out the effects of the crime, unless the language of the pardon absolutely relieve the offender of all the effects thereof.  Considering that recidivism does not prescribe, no matter how long ago was the first conviction, he shall still be a recidivist.

Illustration:

When the crime carries with it moral turpitude, the offender even if granted pardon shall still remain disqualified from those falling in cases where moral turpitude is a bar.

Pedro was prosecuted and convicted of the crime of robbery and was sentenced to six years imprisonment or prision correccional.  After serving sentence for three years, he was granted absolute pardon.  Ten years later, Pedro was again prosecuted and convicted of the crime of theft, a crime embraced in the same title, this time he shall be a recidivist.  On the other hand, if he has served all six years of the first sentence, and his name was included in the list of all those granted absolute pardon, pardon shall relieve him of the effects of the crime, and therefore even if he commits theft again, he shall not be considered a recidivist.

           

In Monsanto V. Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 191, it was held that absolute pardon does not ipso facto entitle the convict to reinstatement to the public office forfeited by reason of his conviction.  Although pardon restores his eligibility for appointment to that office, the pardoned convict must reapply for the new appointment.

Pardon becomes valid only when there is a final judgment.  If given before this, it is premature and hence void.  There is no such thing as a premature amnesty, because it does not require a final judgment; it may be given before final judgment or after it.

 

TRY was sentenced to death by final judgment.

But subsequently he was granted pardon by the President. The pardon was silent on the perpetual disqualification of TRY to hold any public office.

After his pardon, TRY ran for office as Mayor of APP, his hometown. His opponent sought to disqualify him. TRY contended that he is not disqualified because he was already pardoned by the President unconditionally.

Is TRY’s contention correct? Reason briefly.

A: No, TRY’s contention is not correct. Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that when the death penalty is not executed by reason of commutation or pardon, the accessory penalties of perpetual absolute disqualification and civil interdiction during thirty (30) years from the date of the sentence shall remain as the effects thereof, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon. This is because pardon only excuses the convict from serving the sentence but does not relieve him of the effects of the conviction unless expressly remitted in the pardon.

Prescription of crime and prescription of the penalty

Prescription of the crime begins, as a general rule on the day the crime was committed, unless the crime was concealed, not public, in which case, the prescription thereof would only commence from the time the offended party or the government learns of the commission of the crime.

 

OW is a private person engaged in cattle ranching. One night, he saw AM stab CV treacherously, then throw the man’s body into a ravine. For 25 years, CV’s body was never seen nor found; and OW told no one what he had witnessed.

Yesterday, after consulting the parish priest, OW decided to tell the authorities what he witnessed, and revealed that AM killed CV 25 years ago.

Can AM be prosecuted for murder despite the lapse of 25 years? Reason briefly.

A: Yes, AM can be prosecuted for murder despite the lapse of 25 years, because the crime has not yet prescribed and legally, its prescriptive period has not even commenced to run.

The period of prescription of a crime shall commence to run only from the day on which the crime has been discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents (Article 91, RPC). OW, a private person who saw the killing but never disclosed it, is not the offended party nor has the crime been discovered by the authorities or their agents.

“Commission of the crime is public” – This does not mean alone that the crime was within public knowledge or committed in public.

Illustration:

In the crime of falsification of a document that was registered in the proper registry of the government like the Registry of Property or the Registry of Deeds of the Civil registry, the falsification is deemed public from the time the falsified document was registered or recorded in such public office so even though, the offended party may not really know of the falsification, the prescriptive period of the crime shall already run from the moment the falsified document was recorded in the public registry.  So in the case where a deed of sale of a parcel of land which was falsified was recorded in the corresponding Registry of Property, the owner of the land came to know of the falsified transaction only after 10 years, so he brought the criminal action only then.  The Supreme Court ruled that the crime has already prescribed.  From the moment the falsified document is registered in the Registry of Property, the prescriptive period already commenced to run.

When a crime prescribes, the State loses the right to prosecute the offender, hence, even though the offender may not have filed a motion to quash on this ground the trial court, but after conviction and during the appeal he learned that at the time the case was filed, the crime has already prescribed, such accused can raise the question of prescription even for the first time on appeal, and the appellate court shall have no jurisdiction to continue, if legally, the crime has indeed prescribed.

The prevailing rule now is, prescription of the crime is not waivable, the earlier jurisprudence to the contrary had already been abrogated or overruled.  Moreover, for purposes of prescription, the period for filing a complaint or information may not be extended at all, even though the last day such prescriptive period falls on a holiday or a Sunday.

For instance, light felony prescribes in 60 days or two months.  If the 60^th day falls on a Sunday, the filing of the complaint on the succeeding Monday is already fatal to the prosecution of the crime because the crime has already prescribed.

The rules on Criminal Procedure for purposes of prescription is that the filing of the complaint even at the public prosecutor’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive period, but not the filing with the barangays.  So the earlier rulings to the contrary are already abrogated by express provision of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The prescription of the crime is interrupted or suspended –

(1)   When a complaint is filed in a proper barangay for conciliation or mediation as required by Chapter 7, Local government Code, but the suspension of the prescriptive period is good only for 60 days.  After which the prescription will resume to run, whether the conciliation or mediation is terminated for not;

(2)   When criminal case is filed in the prosecutor’s office, the prescription of the crime is suspended until the accused is convicted or the proceeding is terminated for a cause not attributable to the accused.

But where the crime is subject to Summary Procedure, the prescription of the crime will be suspended only when the information is already filed with the trial court.  It is not the filing of the complaint, but the filing of the information in the trial which will suspend the prescription of the crime.

On the prescription of the penalty, the period will only commence to run when the convict has begun to serve the sentence.  Actually, the penalty will prescribe from the moment the convict evades the service of the sentence.  So if an accused was convicted in the trial court, and the conviction becomes final and executory, so this fellow was arrested to serve the sentence, on the way to the penitentiary, the vehicle carrying him collided with another vehicle and overturned, thus enabling the prisoner to escape, no matter how long such convict has been a fugitive from justice, the penalty imposed by the trial court will never prescribe because he has not yet commenced the service of his sentence.  For the penalty to prescribe, he must be brought to Muntinlupa, booked thee, placed inside the cell and thereafter he escapes.

Whether it is prescription of crime or prescription of penalty, if the subject could leave the Philippines and go to a country with whom the Philippines has no extradition treaty, the prescriptive period of the crime or penalty shall remain suspended whenever he is out of the country.

When the offender leaves for a country to which the Philippines has an extradition treaty, the running of the prescriptive period will go on even if the offender leaves Philippine territory for that country.  Presently the Philippines has an extradition treaty with Taiwan, Indonesia, Canada, Australia, USA and Switzerland.  So if the offender goes to any of these countries, the prescriptive period still continues to run.

In the case of the prescription of the penalty, the moment the convict commits another crime while he is fugitive from justice, prescriptive period of the penalty shall be suspended and shall not run in the meantime.  The crime committed does not include the initial evasion of service of sentence that the convict must perform before the penalty shall begin to prescribe, so that the initial crime of evasion of service of sentence does not suspend the prescription of penalty, it is the commission of other crime, after the convict has evaded the service of penalty that will suspend such period.

Marriage

In the case of marriage, do not say that it is applicable for the crimes under Article 344.  It is only true in the crimes of rape, abduction, seduction and acts of lasciviousness.  Do not say that it is applicable to private crimes because the term includes adultery and concubinage.  Marriages in these cases may even compound the crime of adultery or concubinage.  It is only in the crimes of rape, abduction, seduction and acts of lasciviousness that the marriage by the offender with the offended woman shall extinguish civil liability, not only criminal liability of the principal who marries the offended woman, but also that of the accomplice and accessory, if there are any.

Co-principals who did not themselves directly participate in the execution of the crime but who only cooperated, will also benefit from such marriage, but not when such co-principal himself took direct part in the execution of the crime.

Marriage as a ground for extinguishing civil liability must have been contracted in good faith.  The offender who marries the offended woman must be sincere in the marriage and therefore must actually perform the duties of a husband after the marriage, otherwise, notwithstanding such marriage, the offended woman, although already his wife can still prosecute him again, although the marriage remains is avoided or annulled.  The marriage still subsists although the offended woman may re-file the complaint.  The Supreme Court ruled that marriage contemplated must be a real marriage and not one entered to and not just to evade punishment for the crime committed because the offender will be compounding the wrong he has committed.

Partial extinction of criminal liability

Good conduct allowance

This includes the allowance for loyalty under Article 98, in relation to Article 158.  A convict who escapes the place of confinement on the occasion of disorder resulting from a conflagration, earthquake or similar catastrophe or during a mutiny in which he has not participated and he returned within 48 hours after the proclamation that the calamity had already passed, such convict shall be given credit of 1/5 of the original sentence from that allowance for his loyalty of coming back.  Those who did not leave the penitentiary under such circumstances do not get such allowance for loyalty.  Article 158 refers only to those who leave and return.

Parole

This correspondingly extinguishes service of sentence up to the maximum of the indeterminate sentence.  This is the partial extinction referred to, so that if the convict was never given parole, no partial extinction.

CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE OFFENDER

Civil liability of the offender falls under three categories:

Restitution or restoration

Restitution or restoration presupposes that the offended party was divested of property, and such property must be returned.  If the property is in the hands of a third party, the same shall nevertheless be taken away from him and restored to the offended party, even though such third party may be a holder for value and a buyer in good faith of the property, except when such third party buys the property from a public sale where the law protects the buyer.

For example, if a third party bought a property in a public auction conducted by the sheriff levied on the property of a judgment creditor for an obligation, the buyer of the property at such execution sale is protected by law.  The offended party cannot divest him thereof.  So the offended party may only resort to reparation of the damage done from the offender.

Some believed that this civil liability is true only in crimes against property, this is not correct.  Regardless of the crime committed, if the property is illegally taken from the offended party during the commission of the crime, the court may direct the offender to restore or restitute such property to the offended party.  It can only be done if the property is brought within the jurisdiction of that court.

For example, in a case where the offender committed rape, during the rape, the offender got on of the earnings of the victim.  When apprehended, the offender was prosecuted for rape and theft.  When the offender was asked why he got on of the earnings of the victim, the offender disclosed that he took one of the earnings in order to have a souvenir of the sexual intercourse.  Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed is not theft and rape but rape and unjust vexation for the taking of the earning.  The latter crime is not a crime against property, this is a crime against personal security and liberty under Title IX of Book II of the RPC.  And yet, the offender was required to restore or restitute the earning to the offended woman.

Property will have to be restored to the offended party even this would require the taking of the property was divested from the offended party pursuant to the commission of the crime, the one who took the same or accepted the same would be doing so without the benefit of the just title.  So even if the property may have been bought by the third person, the same may be taken from him and restored to the offended party without an obligation on the part of the offended party to pay him whatever he paid.

The right to recover what he has paid will be against the offender who sold it ot him.  On the other hand, if the crime was theft or robbery, the one who received the personal property becomes a fence, he is not only required to restitute the personal property but he incurs criminal liability in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.

If the property cannot be restituted anymore, then the damage must be repaired, requiring the offender to pay the value thereof, as determined by the court.  That value includes the sentimental value to the offended party, not only the replacement cost.  In most cases, the sentimental value is higher than the replacement value.  But if what would be restored is brand new, then there will be an allowance for depreciation, otherwise, the offended party is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of the offender.  So there will be a corresponding depreciation and the offended party may even be required to pay something just to cover the difference of the value of what was restored to him.

The obligation of the offender transcends to his heirs, even if the offender dies, provided he died after judgment became final, the heirs shall assume the burden of the civil liability, but this is only to the extent that they inherit property from the deceased, if they do not inherit, they cannot inherit the obligations.

The right of the offended party transcends to heirs upon death.  The heirs of the offended party step into the shoes of the latter to demand civil liability from the offender.

Reparation of the damage caused

In case of human life, reparation of the damage cause is basically P50,000.00 value of human life, exclusive of other forms of damages.  This P50,000.00 may also increase whether such life was lost through intentional felony or criminal negligence, whether the result of dolo or culpa. 

It was held in the  case of Espaňa v. People (2005) that the award for civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.

Also in the crime of rape, the damages awarded to the offended woman is generally P30,000.00 for the damage to her honor.  In earlier rulings, the amount varied, whether the offended woman is younger or a married woman.  Supreme Court ruled that even if the offended woman does not adduce evidence or such damage, court can take judicial notice of the fact that if a woman was raped, she inevitably suffers damages.  Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a private prosecutor can recover all kinds of damages including attorney’s fee.  The only limitation is that the amount and the nature of the damages should be specified.  The present procedural law does not allow a blanket recovery of damages.  Each kind of damages must be specified and the amount duly proven.

Indemnification of consequential damages

Indemnification of consequential damages refers to the loss of earnings, loss of profits.  This does not refer only to consequential damages suffered by the offended party, this also includes consequential damages to third party who also suffer because of the commission of the crime.

The offender carnapped a bridal car while the newly-weds were inside the church.  Since the car was only rented, consequential damage not only to the newly-weds but also to the entity which rented the car to them.

Most importantly, refer to the persons who are civilly liable under Articles 102 and 103.  This pertains to the owner, proprietor of hotels, inns, taverns and similar establishments, an obligation to answer civilly for the loss or property of their guests.

Under Article 102, two conditions must be present before liability attaches to the innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors:

(1)   The guest must have informed the management in advance of his having brought to the premises certain valuables aside from the usual personal belongings of the guest; and

(2)   The guest must have followed the rules and regulations prescribed by the management of such inn, tavern, or similar establishment regarding the safekeeping of said valuables.

The Supreme Court ruled that even though the guest did not obey the rules and regulations prescribed by the management for safekeeping of the valuables, this does not absolve management from the subsidiary civil liability.  Non-compliance with such rules and regulations but the guests will only be regarded as contributory negligence, but it won’t absolve the management from civil liability.

Liability specially attaches when the management is found to have violated any law or ordinance, rule or regulation governing such establishment.

Even if the crime is robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons or committed by the innkeeper’s employees, management will be liable, otherwise, not liable because there is duress from the offender, liable only for theft and force upon things.

Under Article 103, the subsidiary liability of an employer or master for the crime committed by his employee or servant may attach only when the following requisites concur.

(1)   The employer must be engaged in business or in trade or industry while the accused was his employee

(2)   At the time the crime was committed, the employee-employer relationship must be existing between the two;

(3)   The employee must have been found guilty of the crime charged and accordingly held civilly liable;

(4)   The writ of execution for the satisfaction  of the civil liability was returned unsatisfied because the accused-employee does not have enough property to pay the civil liability.

When these requisites concur, the employer will be subsidiarily, civilly liable for the full amount that his employee was adjudged civilly liable.  It is already settled in jurisprudence that there is no need to file a civil action against the employer in order to enforce the subsidiary civil liability for the crime committed by his employee, it is enough that the writ of execution is returned unsatisfied.  There is no denial of due process of law because the liability of the employer is subsidiary and not primary.  He will only be liable if his employee does not have the property to pay his civil liability, since it is the law itself that, provides that such subsidiary liability exists and ignorance of the law is not an excuse.

Civil liability of the offender is extinguished in the same manner as civil obligation is extinguished but this is not absolutely true.  Under civil law, a civil obligation is extinguished upon loss of the thing due when the things involved is specific.  This is not a ground applicable to extinction of civil liability in criminal case if the thing due is lost, the offender shall repair the damages caused.

When there are several offenders, the court in the exercise of its discretion shall determine what shall be the share f each offender depending upon the degree of participation – as principal, accomplice or accessory.  If within each class of offender, there are more of them, such as more than one principal or more than one accomplice or accessory, the liability in each class of offender shall be subsidiary.  Anyone of them may be required to pay the civil liability pertaining to such offender without prejudice to recovery from those whose share have been paid by another.

If all the principals are insolvent, the obligation shall devolve upon the accomplice(s) or accessory(s).  But whoever pays shall have the right of covering the share of the obligation from those who did not pay but are civilly liable.

To relate with Article 38, when there is an order or preference of pecuniary (monetary) liability, therefore, restitution is not included here.

To relate with Article 38, when there is an order or preference of pecuniary (monetary) liability, therefore, restitution is not included here.

There is not subsidiary penalty for non-payment of civil liability.

Subsidiary civil liability is imposed in the following:

(1)   In case of a felony committed under the compulsion of an irresistible force.  The person who employed the irresistible force is subsidiarily liable;

(2)   In case of a felony committed under an impulse of an equal or greater injury.

The person who generated such an impulse is subsidiarily liable.

The owners of taverns, inns, motels, hotels, where the crime is committed within their establishment due to noncompliance with general police regulations, if the offender who is primarily liable cannot pay, the proprietor, or owner is subsidiarily liable.

Felonies committed by employees, pupils, servants in the course of their employment, schooling or household chores.  The employer, master, teacher is subsidiarily liable civilly, while the offender is primarily liable.

In case the accomplice and the principal cannot pay, the liability of those subsidiarily liable is absolute.

In People vs. Tupal, 2003, exemplary damages were awarded when the offense was committed with at least 1 aggravating circumstance.

COMPLEX CRIME

Philosophy behind plural crimes:  The treatment of plural crimes as one is to be lenient to the offender, who, instead of being made to suffer distinct penalties for every resulting crime is made to suffer one penalty only, although it is the penalty for the most serious one and is in the maximum period.  Purpose is in the pursuance of the rule of pro reo.

If be complexing the crime, the penalty would turn out to be higher, do not complex anymore.

Example:  Murder and theft (killed with treachery, then stole the right).

Penalty:  If complex – Reclusion temporal maximum to death.

If treated individually – Reclusion temporal to Reclusion Perpetua

Complex-crime is not just a matter of penalty, but of substance under the Revised Penal Code.

Plurality of crimes my be in the form of:

(1)   Compound Crime,

(2)   Complex crime; and

(3)   Composite crime.

A compound crime is one where a single act produces two or more crimes.

A complex crime strictly speaking is one where the offender has to commit an offense as a means  for the commission of another offense.  It is said that the offense is committed as a necessary means to commit the other offense.  “Necessary’ should not be understood as indispensable, otherwise, it shall be considered absorbed and not giving rise to a complex crime.

A composite crime is one in which substance is made up of more than one crime, but which in the eyes of the law is only a single indivisible offense.  This is also known as special complex crime.  Examples are robbery with homicide, robbery with rape, rape with homicide.  These are crimes which in the eye of the law are regarded only as a single indivisible offense.

 

Q: Distinguish between an ordinary complex crime and a special complex crime as to their concepts and as to the imposition of penalties.

A: An ordinary complex crime is made up of 2 or more crimes being punished in distinct provisions of the RPC but alleged in one information, so that only 1 penalty will be imposed, because either they were brought about by a single act or one offense was a necessary means to commit another. The penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.

On the other hand, a special complex crime is made up of 2 or more crimes that are considered only as components of a single indivisible offense punished in one provision of the RPC. The component crimes are not regarded as distinct  crimes  so only one penalty is specifically prescribed for all of them.

Composite Crime/Special  Complex Crime

This is one which is substance is made up of more than one crime but which in the eyes of the law is only a single indivisible offense.  This is also known as a special complex crime. Example are robbery with homicide, robbery with rape, and rape with homicide.

The compound crime and the complex crime are treated in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.  But in such article, a compound crime is also designated as a complex crime, but “complex crimes” are limited only to a situation where the resulting felonies are grave and/or less grave.

Whereas in a compound crime, there is no limit as to the gravity of the resulting crimes as long as a single act brings about two or more crimes.  Strictly speaking, compound crimes are not limited to grave less grave felonies but covers all single act that results in two or more crimes.

Illustration:

A person threw a hand grenade and the people started scampering.  When the hand grenade exploded, no on was seriously wounded all  were mere wounded.  It was held that this is a compound crime, although the resulting felonies are only slight.

Illustration of a situation where the term “necessary” in complex crime should not be understood as indispensable:

Abetting committed during the encounter between rebels and government troops such that the homicide committed cannot be complexed with rebellion.  This is because they are indispensable part of rebellion.  (Caveat: Ortega says rebellion can be complexed with common crimes in discussion on Rebellion)

The complex crime lies actually in the first form under Article 148.

The first form of the complex crime is actually a compound crime, is one where  a single act constitutes two or more grave and/or less grave felonies.  The basis in complexing or compounding the crime is the act.  So that when an offender performed more than one act, although similar, if they result in separate crimes, there is no complex crime at all, instead, the offender shall be prosecuted for as many crimes as are committed under separate information.

When the single act brings about two or more crimes, the offender is punished with only one penalty, although in the maximum period, because he acted only with single criminal impulse.  The presumption is that, since there is only one criminal impulse and correctly, only one penalty should be imposed.

Conversely, when there are several acts performed, the assumption is that each act is  impelled by a distinct criminal  impulse, a separate penalty.  However, it may happen that the offender is impelled only by a single criminal impulse in committing a series of acts that brought about more than one crime, considering that Criminal Law, if there is only one criminal impulse which brought about  the commission of the crime, the offender should be penalized only once.

There are in fact cases decided by the Supreme Court where the offender has performed as series of acts but the acts appeared to be impelled by one and the same impulse, the ruling is that a complex crime is committed.  In this case it is not the singleness of the act but the singlessness of the impulse that has been considered.  There are cases where the Supreme Court held that the crime committed is complex even though the offender performed not a single act but a series of acts.  The only reason is that the series of acts are impelled by a single criminal impulse.

 

Q: A learned two days ago that B received dollar bills worth $10,000 from his daughter working in the US. With the intention of robbing B, A entered B’s house at midnight, armed with a knife used to gain entry and began quietly searching the drawers and other likely receptacles for cash. While doing that, B awoke, rushed out of his room and grappled with A for the possession of the knife. A stabbed B to death, found the latter’s wallet beneath the pillow, which was bulging with the dollar bills he was looking for. A took the bills and left the house. What crime/s was/were committed?

A: The crime committed was robbery with homicide, a composite crime. A’s primordial criminal intent is to commit a robbery and in the course of the robbery, B was killed. Both robbery and the killing were consummated, thus giving rise to the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The primary criminal intent being to commit a robbery, any killing on the “occasion” of the robbery, though not by reason thereof, is considered a component of the crime of robbery with homicide as a single indivisible offense.

CONTINUED AND CONTINUING CRIMES

In criminal law, when a series of acts are perpetrated in pursuance of a single criminal impulse, there is what is called a continued crime.  In criminal procedure for purposes of venue, this is referred to as a continuing crime.

The term “continuing crimes” as sometimes used in lieu of the term “continued crimes”, however, although both terms are analogous, they are not really used with the same import.  “Continuing crime” is the term used in criminal procedure to denote that a certain crime may be prosecuted and tried not only before the court of the place where it was originally committed or began, but also before the court of the place where the crime was continued.  Hence, the term “continuing crime” is used in criminal procedure when any of the material ingredients of the crime was committed in different places.

A “continued crime” is one where the offender performs a series of acts violating one and the same penal provision committed at the same place and about the same time for the same criminal purpose, regardless of a series of acts done, it is regarded in law as one.

In People v. de Leon, where the accused took five roosters from one and the same chicken coop, although the roosters were owned by different persons, it was held that there is only one crime of theft committed because the accused acted out of a single criminal impulse only.  However performing a series of acts but this is one and the same intent Supreme Court ruled that only one crime is committed under one information.

In People v. Lawas, the accused constabulary soldiers were ordered to march with several muslims from one barrio to another place.  These soldiers feared that on the way some of the  Muslims may escape.  So Lawas ordered the men  to tie the Muslims by the hand connecting one with the other, so on one would run away.  When the hands of the Muslims were tied, one of them protested, he did not want to be included among those who were tied because he was a Hajjii, so the Hajji remonstrated and there was commotion. At the height of the commotion, Lawas ordered his men to fire, and the soldiers mechanically fired.  Eleven were killed and several others were wounded.  The question of whether the constabulary soldiers should be prosecuted for the killing of each under a separate information has reached the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court ruled that the accused should be prosecuted only in one information, because a complex crime of multiple homicide was committed by them.

In another case, a band of robbers came across a compound where a sugar mill is located.  The workers of said mill have their quarters within the compound.  The band of robbers ransacked the different quarters therein.  It was held that there is only one crime committed – multiple robbery, not because  of Article 48 but because this is a continued crime.  When the robbers entered the compound, they were moved by a single criminal intent.  Not because there were several quarter robbed.  This becomes a complex crime.

The definition in Article 48 is not honored because the accused did not perform a single act.  There were a series of acts, but the decision in the Lawas case is correct.  The confusion lies in this.  While Article 48 speaks of a complex crime where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave offenses, event hose cases when the act is not a single but a series of acts resulting to two or more grave and less grave felonies, the Supreme Court considered this a complex crime when the act is the product of one single criminal impulse.

If confronted with a problem, use the standard or condition that it refers not only to the singleness of the act which brought two or more grave and/less grave felonies.  The Supreme Court has extended this class of complex crime to those cases when the offender performed not a single act but a series of acts as long as it is the product of a single criminal impulse.

You cannot find an article in the Revised Penal Code with respect to the continued crime or continuing crime.  The nearest article is Article 48.  Such situation is also brought under the operation of Article 48.

In People v. Garcia, the accused were convicts who were members of a certain gang and they conspired to kill the other gang.  Some of the accused killed their victims in one place within the same penitentiary, some killed the others in another place within the same penitentiary.  The Supreme Court ruled that all accused should be punished under one information because they acted in conspiracy.  The act of one is the act of all.  Because there were several victims killed and some were mortally wounded, the accused should be held for the complex crime of multiple homicide with multiple frustrated homicide.  There is a complex crime not only when there is a single act but a series of acts.  It is correct that when the offender acted in conspiracy, this crime is considered as one and prosecuted under one information.  Although in this case, the offenders did not only kills one person but killed different persons, so it is clear that in killing of one victim or the killing of another victim, another act out of this is done simultaneously. Supreme Court considered this as complex.  Although the killings did not result from one single act.

In criminal procedure, it is prohibited to charge more than one offense in an information, except when the crimes is one information constitute a complex crime or a special complex crime.

So whenever the Supreme Court concludes that the criminal should be punished only once, because they acted in conspiracy or under the same criminal impulse, it is necessary to embody these crimes under one single information.  It is necessary to consider them as complex crimes even if the essence of the crime does not fit the definition of Art 48, because there is no other provision in the RPC.

Duplicity of offenses, in order not to violate this rule, it must be called a complex crime.

In earlier rulings on abduction with rape, if several offenders abducted the woman and abused her, there is multiple rape.  The offenders are to be convicted of one count of rape and separately charged of the other rapes.

In People v. Jose, there were four participants here.  They abducted the woman, after which, the four took turns in abusing her.  It was held that each one of the four became liable not only for his own rape but also for those committed by the others.  Each of the four offenders  was convicted of four rapes.  In the eyes of the law, each committed four crimes of rape.  One of the four rapes committed by one of them was complexed with the crime of abduction.  The other three rapes are distinct counts or rape.  The three rapes are not necessary to commit the other rapes.  Therefore, separate complaints/information.

In People v. Pabasa, the Supreme Court through Jusitce Aquino ruled that there is only one count of forcible abduction with rape committed by the offenders who abducted the two women and abused them several times. This was only a dissenting opinion of Justice Aquino, that there could be only one complex crime of abduction with rape, regardless of the number of rapes committed because all the rapes are but committed out of one and the same lewd design which impelled the offender to abduct the victim.

In People v. Bojas, the Supreme Court followed the ruling in People v. Jose that the four men who abducted and abused the offended women were held liable for one crime – one count or forcible abduction with rape and distinct charges for rape for the other rapes committed by them.

In People v. Bulaong, the Supreme Court adopted the dissenting opinion of Justice Aquino in People v. Pabasa, that when several persons abducted a woman and abused her, regardless of the number of rapes committed, there should only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.  The rapes committed were in the nature of a continued crime characterized by the same lewd design which is an essential element in the crime of forcible abduction.

The abuse amounting to rape is complexed with forcible abduction because the abduction was already consummated when the victim was raped.  The forcible abduction must be complexed therewith.  But the multiple rapes should be considered only as one because they are in the nature of a continued crime.

Note:    This is a dangerous view because the abductors will commit as much rape as they can, after all, only one complex crime of rape would arise.

In adultery, each intercourse constitutes one crime.  Apparently, the singleness of the act is not considered a single crime.  Each intercourse bring with it the danger of bringing one stranger in the family of the husband.

Article 48 also applies in cases when out a single act of negligence or imprudence, two or more grave or less grave felonies resulted, although only the first part thereof (compound crime).  The second part of Article 48 does not apply, referring to the complex crime proper because this applies or refers only to a deliberate commission of one offense to commit another offense.

However, a light felony may result from criminal negligence or imprudence, together with other grave or less grave felonies resulting therefrom and the Supreme Court held that all felonies resulting from criminal negligence should be made subject of one information only.  The reason being that, there is only one information and prosecution only.  Otherwise, it would be tantamount to splitting the criminal negligence similar to splitting a cause of action which is prohibited in civil cases.

Although under Article 48, a light felony should not be included in a complex crime, yet by virtue of this ruling of the Supreme Court, the light felony shall be included in the same information charging the offender with grave and/or less grave felonies resulting from the negligence of reckless imprudence and this runs counter to the provision of Article 48.  So while the Supreme Court ruled that the light felony resulting from the same criminal negligence should be complexed with the other felonies because that would be a blatant violation of Article 48, instead the Supreme Court stated that an additional penalty should be imposed for the light felony.  This would mean two penalties to be imposed, one for the complex crime and one for the light felony.  It cannot separate the light felony because it appears that the culpa is crime itself and you cannot split the crime.

Applying the concept of the “continued crime”, the following cases have been treated as constituting one crime only:

(1)   The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different persons committed by the accused at the same place and period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320);

(2)   The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranilla);

(3)   The illegal charging of fees for service rendered by a lawyer every time he collected veteran’s benefits on behalf of a client who agreed that attorney’s fees shall be paid out of such benefits (People v.  Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156).  The collections of legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal impulse.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court declined to apply the concept in the following cases:

(1)   Two Estafa cases, one which was committed during the period from January 19 to December, 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 13 Phil 306).  Said acts were committed on two different occasions;

(2)   Several malversations committed in May, June and July 1936 and falsifications to conceal said offenses committed in August and October, 1936.  The malversations and falsifications were not the result of one resolution to embezzle and falsity (People v. CIV, 66 Phil. 351);

(3)   Seventy-five estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agents of collections from the customers of the employers made on different dates.

In the theft cases, the trend is to follow the single larceny doctrine, that is taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place, constitutes one larceny only.  Many courts have abandoned the separate larceny doctrine, under which there was distinct larceny as to the property of each victim:

Also abandoned is the doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused for one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (Santiago v. Justice Garchitorena, decided on December 2, 1993).  Here, the accused was charged with performing a single act – that of approving the legalization of aliens not qualified under the law.  The prosecution manifested that they would only file one information.  Subsequently, 32 amended informations were filed.  The Supreme Court directed the prosecution to consolidate the cases into one offense because (1) they were in violation of the same law – Executive Order No. 324; (2) caused injury to one party only – the government; and (3) they were done in the same day.  The concept of delito continuado has been applied to crimes under special laws since in Article 10, the Revised Penal Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provides the contrary.