Remedial Law Digests 1

JURISDICTION

JUAN V. PEOPLE

18 Jan.2000

Facts:  A et al., were charged before the RTC with an election offense punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years. They argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction over their cases since the penalty for the offense charged does not exceed 6 years.

Issue:  Whether MTC or RTC has jurisdiction

Held:   RTC has jurisdiction. Pursuant to Sec.32 BP 129, as amended by Section 2 of RA 7691, the jurisdiction of first-level courts- the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC- does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law are cognizable by the RTC, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefore.

PHIL. VETERANS BANK V. CA

18 Jan. 2000

Facts:  P’s land was taken by DAR pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. P contended that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just compensation for the taking of lands under CARP because such jurisdiction is vested in the RTC.

Issue:  Whether the DAR or RTC has jurisdiction

Held:   DAR has jurisdiction. There is nothing contradictory between the DAR’s primary jurisdiction over “agrarian reform matters” and exclusive original jurisdiction over “all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,” which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the RTC’s “original and exclusive jurisdiction” over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to the landowner. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under CARP, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.

DUCAT V. CA

20 Jan. 2000

Facts:  D lost in a civil case. There was already execution of judgment. The trial court denied his Motion to Annul the Execution Sale, Motion to Reconsider, and Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Implementation of the Writ of Possession. Instead of filing a petition for certiorari, D presented before the trial court a Manifestation and Motion to Set Parameters of Computation. The trial then issued an Alias Writ of Possession against D which he questioned.

Issue:  Whether D can validly question the court’s authority to issue the writ

Held:   No. It is too late for D to question the subject order of the court. D could have taken recourse to the CA but he did not. Instead, he manifested acquiescence to the said order by seeking parameters before the trial court. If the parties acquiesced in submitting an issue for determination by the trial court, they are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the same court to pas upon the issue.

LLORENTE V. ANDIGANBAYAN

19 Jan. 2000

Facts:  A, a mayor, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of RA 3019. Pending the case, Congress enacted RA 7975, limiting the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A then contended that by virtue of RA 7975, the Sandiganbayan lost jurisdiction over his case.

Issue:  Whether the Sandiganbayan was divested of jurisdiction

Held:   No. To determine whether the official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reference should be made to RA 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services, position Titles, and Salary Grades. A municipal mayor is classified under Salary Grade 27. Thus, the case against A is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

MARQUEZ V. COMELEC

25 Aug. 1999

Facts: D won in the SK elections. P filed an election protest before the MTC. D assailed the jurisdiction of the MTC over the case.

Issue:  Whether the MTC has jurisdiction

Held:   Yes. Any contest relating to the election of SK members (including the Chairman) – whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner of their election – is cognizable by the MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs. Before proclamation, cases concerning eligibility of SK officers and members are cognizable by the Election Officer as provided in Sec. 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. After election and proclamation, the same cases become quo warranto cases cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs.

SAURA V. SAURA

1 Sept. 1999

Facts:  P filed a case against D with the SEC. P also filed a civil case for the annulment of a sale against D before the RTC. D filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court.

Issue:  Whether the SEC or the RTC has jurisdiction

Held:   The RTC has jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction of the SEC is determined by a concurrence of 2 elements: (1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of the controversy. IN this case, the complaint for annulment of the sale is an ordinary civil action, which is beyond the limited jurisdiction of the SEC.

BENAVIDEZ V. CA

6 Sept. 1999

Facts:  P filed a forcible entry case against D. D argued that he owned the property. D surmised that since the issue of ownership is involved and only in resolving it can the issue of possession be finally settled, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:  Whether the MTC retains jurisdiction

Held:   Yes. Following B. P. 129, the MTC now retains jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership provided that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of determining possession.

SANCHEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN

7 Sept. 1999

Facts:  Court martial proceedings were initiated against A and B for violation of RA 3019. The Ombudsman also filed a similar case against A and B with the Sandiganbayan. A and B filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their case.

Issue:  Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction

Held:   No. In view of the enactment of RA 7975, approved on 30 March 1995, the Sandiganbayan “lost” its jurisdiction over the case primarily because the public officials charged here were officers of the Phil. Army below the rank of full colonel. The enactment of RA 7975 was precisely to declog the Sandiganbayan’s docket of “small fry” cases.

ORGANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN

9 Sept. 1999

Facts:  A et al. were charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan. They assailed the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:  Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction

Held:   No. None of the accused occupied positions corresponding to Salary Grade “27” or higher. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade “27” or higher, in relation to their office (pursuant to RA 8249). 

UNION MOTORS CORPORATION V. NLRC

16 Sept. 1999

Facts:  D was P’s Assistant to the President and Administrative and Personnel Manager. She thereafter filed a complaint for constructive/illegal dismissal with the NLRC.

Issue:  Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over D’s case

Held:   No. The SEC, not the NLRC, has jurisdiction. The records clearly show that D’s position as Assistant to the President and Personnel and Administrative Manager is a corporate office under the by-laws of P. It is clear that the charges filed by D against P arising from her ouster as a corporate officer, is an intra-corporate controversy. For the SEC to take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships: (a) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public (b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers (c) between the corporation, partnership or association and the state so far as its franchise, permit, or license to operate is concerned; and  (d) among the stockholders, partners, or associates themselves. The instant case is a dispute between a corporation and one of its officers. As such, D’s complaint is subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, and not the NLRC.

ANGAT V. REPUBLIC

14 Sept.1999

Facts:  P was a natural born citizen who lost his citizenship by naturalization in the US. On March 11, 1996, he filed a petition with the RTC to regain his status as a citizen of the Philippines. The court thereafter repatriated P.

Issue:  Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over repatriation cases

Held:   No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with the RTC which has no jurisdiction thereover. The court’s order was thereby null and void. The Special Committee on Naturalization was reactivated on June 8, 1995, hence, when P filed his petition on March 11, 1996, the Committee constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under PD No. 725 (a Decree providing for repatriation of Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural born Filipinos) was in place.

DELTAVENTURES V.CABATO

9 March 2000

Facts:  The NLRC declared D guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. A writ of execution was issued. D filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction and damages. RTC issued a TRO. The laborers moved for the dismissal of the civil case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:  Whether the RTC had jurisdiction

Held:   No. The RTC has no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom, including the execution of decisions, awards or orders. The RTC, being a co-equal body of the NLRC, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter.

ABBOT VS. HON. MAPAYO

G.R. NO. 134102 (2000)

Facts: P was charged with a crime before the Sandiganbayan. By virtue of R.A. 7975 amending P.D. 1606, the case was transferred to the RTC. P filed a motion to dismiss which the RTC denied. P filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to reverse the ruling of the RTC. The Solicitor General filed a Comment, raising the point that the CA was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition because jurisdiction was already vested in the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari and prohibition

Held: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was expanded in RA 7975 to include petitions for the issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

SIASOCO VS. NARVASA

315 SCRA 144 (1999)

Facts: P filed with the trial court a complaint for specific performance against subdivision developers to compel the latter to execute deeds of absolute sale and to deliver the certificates of title to buyers.

Issue: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over such as a complaint.

Held: No. Under the Executive Order creating it, the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction to “hear  and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and cases of specific performance.”

JOSE OROSA VS. CA

G.R. No. 111080 (2000)

Facts: The RTC rendered a decision, holding X and Y solidarily liable for damages to P. Y filed with the CA a petition for certiorari  to annul the Supplemental Decision. On the other hand, X appealed the decision of the RTC to the CA.  Y’s petition for certiorari was dismissed by the CA First Division. Meanwhile, in X’s appeal, the CA Eighth Division partially affirmed the ruling of the RTC. P questions the CA Eighth Division’s jurisdiction to review the case since the CA First Division already passed upon the law and facts of the same.

Issue: Whether the CA Eighth Division had jurisdiction to review the case

Held: Yes. Jurisdiction is simply the power or authority to hear a case. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to review decisions and orders of lower courts is conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. More importantly, P cannot now assail the CA’s jurisdiction after having actively participated in the appeal and after praying for affirmative relief.

SALVADOR DE VERA VS. HON. PELAYO

G.R. No. 137354 (2000)

Facts: P filed a criminal case against Judge X for knowingly rendering unjust judgment and malicious delay in the administration of justice before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman referred the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. P assails the referral of the case to the Supreme Court arguing that the Ombudsman, not the Supreme Court, is the one vested with jurisdiction to resolve whether the crime charged was committed by the judge.

Issue: Whether the referral of the case to the Supreme Court is correct

Held: Yes. Before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205 can be entertained, there must first be “a final and authoritative judicial declaration” that the decision or order in question is indeed “unjust.” The pronouncement may result from either: (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment; or (b) an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial function.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Bail

LAYOLA V. JUDGE GABO

26 Jan. 2000

Facts:  Police officers A & B were accused of murder. Judge issued an order allowing the Chief of Police to take A & B under his custody instead of placing them in jail.

Issue:  Whether or not the judge’s action is proper

Held:   No. Murder is a capital offense so the judge should have been mindful that bail couldn’t be allowed as a matter of right as provided in Rule 114 section 2.

TOLENTINO V. CAMANO

20 Jan. 2000

Facts:  A was accused of violating the Child Abuse Act. The maximum penalty for the offense is reclusion perpetua. The State Prosecutor failed to appear at the bail hearings set by the court. The judge then granted bail.

Issue:  Whether the judge’s order granting bail was proper

Held:   No. When the charge against the accused is for a capital offense, there must be a hearing with the participation of the prosecution and the defense, in order to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong and whether bail should therefore be granted. In this case, the State Prosecutor was given a number of opportunities to present evidence but he was remiss in the performance of his duties. Still, the judge should not have granted bail based simply on the failure of the prosecution to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong but should have endeavored to determine the existence of such evidence.

Civil Liability

SAPIERA V. CA

10 Sept. 1999

Facts:  The estafa cases filed against A were dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence.

Issue:  Whether the dismissal of the criminal cases erased A’s civil liability

Held:   No. The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist.

Compromise Prohibited

CHUA V. MACAPUGAY

13 Aug. 1999

Facts:  P filed a complaint against D for illegal encroachment. P likewise filed a criminal complaint against the City Engineer for violation of RA 3019 and the RPC. Later, P and D entered into a compromise agreement, which was approved, by the court. The case between P and D was thereafter dismissed.

Issue:  Whether the compromise affected the criminal case against the city engineer

Held:   No. Indeed, the Civil Code not only defines and authorizes compromises (Art. 2028), it in fact encourages them in civil actions. However, the compromise agreement cannot affect the charges against the city engineer. The law abhors settlement of criminal liability.  However, in this case, the Ombudsman did not find probable cause against the city engineer so the case was dismissed.

Demurrer  To Evidence

GUTIB V. CA

13 Aug. 1999

Facts:  A, B, C, and others were charged with qualified theft before the RTC. After the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution, A and B filed their separate demurrers to the evidence with prior leave of court. The judge denied A’s demurrer for lack of factual and legal basis but granted B’s demurrer.

Issue:  Whether A’s demurrer should also be granted

Held:   Yes. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution miserably failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime of qualified theft. Thus, A’s demurrer to the evidence should have been granted.

 

Deposition

PEOPLE V. WEBB

17 Aug. 1999

Facts:  A was accused of rape with homicide. During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, A filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of certain persons in the United States. The trial court denied the motion.

Issue:  Whether A’s motion should have been granted

Held:   No. A deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice—particularly on the defense of alibi, which is A’s main defense in the criminal proceedings against him—states that when a person intends to rely on such defense, that person must move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for filing a pre-trial motion.

 

Final Order

BAÑARES V. BALISING

13 March 2000

Facts:  A, B, C, D, and E were accused of estafa. They filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the criminal case without prejudice. After more than 2 months, private complainants sought the revival of the criminal case. When the trial court allowed revival of the case, the accused questioned the order, claiming that the prior dismissal had already become final and executory.

Issue:  Whether the said order became final and executory

Held:   Yes. An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. The law grants an aggrieved party a period of 15 days from his receipt of the decision or order to appeal or move to reconsider the same. After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the court’s power to amend and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.

Forum Shopping

PNB-REPUBLIC BANK V. CA

10 Sept. 1999

Facts:  P asked the help of the NBI to investigate on the undelivered T-Bills. The NBI thereafter filed a criminal case before the Office of the Ombudsman against D. Subsequently, P also filed a complaint against D with the RTC.

Issue:  Whether there was forum shopping

Held:   No. A case before the Ombudsman cannot be considered for purposes of determining if there was forum shopping. The power of the Ombudsman is only investigatory in character and its resolution cannot constitute a valid and final judgment because its duty, assuming it determines that there is an actionable criminal or non-criminal act or omission, is to file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan. It is not yet known whether the Ombudsman would file a case against the culprits.

Information

VASQUEZ V. CA

15 Sept. 1999

Facts:  The Information charging A with libel did not set out the entire news article as published.

Issue:  Whether the defect in the Information can be cured by evidence

Held:   Yes. While the general rule is that the Information must set out the particular defamatory words verbatim and as published and that a statement of their substance is insufficient, a defect in this regard may be cured by evidence. In this case, the article was presented in evidence, but A failed to object to its introduction. Instead, he engaged in the trial of the entire article, not only of the portions quoted in the Information, and sought to prove it to be true. In doing so, he waived objection based on the defect in the Information. Consequently, he cannot raise this issue at this last stage.

 

PEOPLE V. ROMAN

14 Sept. 1999

Facts:  A raped X thrice on the same afternoon. However, the Information charged him of only one act of rape.

Issue:  Whether A can be convicted of three acts of rape

Held:   No. Although it is not disputed that A had carnal knowledge of X thrice on that same afternoon, since the Information only charged A of one act of rape, the lower court did not err in ruling that A can only be held liable for one act of rape.

Legal Personality Of Private Complainant To File A Special Civil Action

PEREZ V. HAGONOY RURAL BANK

9 March 2000

Facts:  A complaint for estafa was filed against A, B and C. The Secretary of Justice directed the dismissal of the complaint. Private complainant P filed a petition for certiorari which was granted by the CA. A, B and C questioned the CA ruling.

Issue:  Whether P had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case

Held:   Yes. Indeed, it is only the Solicitor General who may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. However, the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings, before the courts of law, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Motion To Quash

 

DOMINGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN

20 Jan. 2000

Facts:  A was accused of violating RA 3109 before the Sandiganbayan. A filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. His motion was denied.

Issue:  Whether the information should be quashed

Held:   No. A motion to quash on the ground that the allegations do not constitute the offense charged should be resolved on the basis of the allegations alone whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. In this case, the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of RA 3019 so the motion to quash must fail.

PEOPLE V. LOPEZ

19 Aug. 1999

Facts:  A was convicted of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder. A appealed, saying that the information filed against him was formally defective, as it charged more than one offense in violation of Rule 110 Sec. 13.

Issue: Whether the judgment should be reversed in view of the defective information

Held:   No. Indeed, the information is formally defective for it charged more than one offense. However, because of his failure to file a motion to quash, A is deemed to have waived objection based on the ground of duplicity. The Supreme Court merely modified the judgment finding that A should be held liable for three separate crimes.

MARTINEZ V. PEOPLE

20 Aug. 1999

Facts:  A was charged with malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan. A filed a motion to quash the information against him alleging that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash “for obvious lack of merit.” A then filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:  Whether A took the proper recourse

Held:   No. The Sandiganbayan correctly denied A’s motion to quash. From such denial, the appropriate remedy is not appeal or review on certiorari. The remedy is for the petitioner to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.

Power Of Supervision And Control Of The Secretary Of Justice

JALANDONI V. DRILON

2 March 2000

Facts:  A filed a complaint for libel against D. The prosecutor recommended the indictment of D so an information for libel was filed with the RTC. D appealed to the Secretary of Justice who directed the withdrawal of the complaint. A sought to nullify the DOJ resolution.

Issue:  Whether the Secretary of Justice committed an error

Held:   No. The Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions or decisions of provincial or city prosecutors or the Chief State Prosecutor upon petition by a proper party. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the secretary of justice exercises the power of direst control and supervision over said prosecutors. He may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings, as he may deem fit.

Preliminary Investigation

PEOPLE V. ARLEE

25 Jan. 2000

Facts:  A was accused of raping X. A contended that he was deprived of the right to a preliminary investigation since he was not able to receive the subpoenas sent to him.

Issue:  Whether or not A was deprived of his right to preliminary investigation

Held:   No. The presence of the accused is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of preliminary investigation. Pursuant to Rule 112 section 3 (d), a preliminary investigation was actually conducted and the Prosecutor found a prima facie case. A also applied for bail and voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment, thereby effectively waiving his right to a preliminary investigation.

LIANG V. PEOPLE

28 Jan. 2000

Facts:  A was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) with 2 counts of grave oral defamation. A was arrested. He contended that he was denied the right to preliminary investigation.

Issue:  Whether a preliminary investigation should be given

Held:   No. Preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information.

Writ Of Injunction/Prohibition

DOMINGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN

20 Jan. 2000

Facts:  A was accused of violating RA 3109 before the Sandiganbayan. A wished to enjoin the criminal proceedings against him.

Issue:  Whether granting a writ of injunction or prohibition to stay a criminal proceeding would be proper

Held:   No. Writs of injunction and prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society. The writ may issue only in specified cases (e.g., to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive manner and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights). Such exceptions do not obtain in this case.

Validity Of Judgment

 

PEOPLE V. GARCIA

30 Aug. 1999

Facts:  Judge D convicted A of illegal possession of prohibited drugs. The decision was promulgated on 20 Feb. 1996. Judge D’s retirement was approved in April 1996 but the effectively of the retirement was made retroactive to 16 Feb. 1996. B then assailed his conviction because it was promulgated 4 days after Judge D’s retirement.

Issue:  Whether the decision is void

Held:   No. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, a decision is valid and binding only if it is penned and promulgated by the judge during his incumbency. A judgment has legal effect only when it is rendered: (a) by a court legally constituted and in actual exercise of judicial powers; and (b) by a judge legally appointed, duly qualified, and actually acting either de jure or de facto. Judge D was a de facto judge in the actual exercise of his duties at the time the decision was promulgated. Such decision is therefore legal and has a valid and binding effect.

                                 

Affidavit of desistance

PEOPLE VS. ARMANDO ALICANTE

G.R. NO. 127026-27 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with rape committed against his minor daughter, X. X’s mother, however, executed an affidavit of desistance. The trial court convicted A of rape.

Issue: Whether the affidavit of desistance is a ground for dismissal of a criminal case.

Held: No. A perusal of the affidavit of desistance reveals that while X signed the said document, the intent to pardon A was only on the part of X’s mother and not X herself. Besides, the Court looks with disfavor on affidavits of desistance.

Arraignment

ARQUERO VS. MENDOZA

315 SCRA 503 (1999)

Facts: A’s arraignment was originally set for August 15 but it was postponed 9 times before it was finally held. On one occasion, A appeared in the scheduled arraignment with new lawyers who both asked for postponement on the ground that their services had just been engaged and they needed time to study the case. The judge postponed the arraignment of A.

Issue: Whether the postponement of the arraignment was proper.

Held: No. The fact that A hired new lawyers to represent her does not justify the postponement of the arraignment over the strong objection of the private prosecutor. The Rules of Court provide that “whenever a counsel de oficio is assigned by the Court to defend the accused at the arraignment, he shall be given at least 1 hour to consult with the accused as to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment.” There is no reason why a different rule should be applied to a counsel de parte where services have just been engaged by the accused. There was absolutely no reason why counsel could not have been required to confer with the accused within a shorter period to prepare for the arraignment.

PEOPLE VS. BONIFACIO DURANGO

G.R. NO. 135438-39 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with rape. During arraignment, A entered a plea of not guilty. During the trial, A’s defense counsel manifested to the court that A wanted to withdrew his earlier plea of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty. On the basis of the manifestation, A was re-arraigned, and this time A pleaded guilty. After the prosecution had concluded its presentation, the RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to death.

Issue: Whether the RTC erred in convicting A despite his improvident plea of guilty

Held: Yes. When an accused enters a plea of guilty, the trial court is mandated to see to it that the exacting standards laid down by the rules therefore are strictly observed. It cannot be said that when a person pleads guilty to a crime there is no chance at all that he could, in fact, be innocent. The improvident plea, followed by an abbreviated proceeding, with practically no role at all played by the defense is just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit human life.

Arrest

PEOPLE VS. DENNIS LEGASPI

G.R. NO. 117802 (2000)

Facts: A was illegally arrested. During arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty.

Issue: Whether A validly waived their right to raise the infirmity of their arrest.

Held: Yes. Upon entering a plea of not guilty, A validly waived his right to raise this infirmity and assail the legality of the arrest. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of the jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.

Automatic review

GARCIA VS. PEOPLE

318 SCRA 434 (1999)

Facts: The RTC found A guilty of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. A did not interpose a timely appeal. Thus, the decision became final. P filed a special civil action for mandamus to compel the RTC to forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Issue: Whether the Supreme Court must automatically review a trial court’s decision convicting an accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

Held: No. It is only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review of the conviction.

Custodial investigation

PEOPLE VS. EDUARDO PAVILLARE

G.R. NO. 129970 (2000)

Facts: A, without the assistance of counsel, was identified by the complainant in a police-line up as one of the kidnappers. He was subsequently found guilty with kidnapping for ransom.

Issue: Whether the identification made by the complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because A stood up at the line-up without the assistance of counsel.

Held: No. The Constitution prohibits custodial investigation conducted without the assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional mandate is inadmissible in evidence. The prohibition however, does not extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage of an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. The stage of the investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line-up is outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature.

PEOPLE VS. DENNIS LEGASPI

G.R. NO. 117802 (2000)

Facts: The police invited A for questioning. A was asked a single question at the police station regarding his whereabouts on the day of the crime.

Issue: Whether custodial investigation occurred.

Held: No. A was not yet singled out as the perpetrator of the crime. He was merely invited for questioning. The query on A was merely part of the “general exploratory stage”.

PEOPLE VS. JIMMY OBRERO

G.R. NO. 122142 (2000)

Facts: A is a suspect in a crime. He was taken for custodial investigation wherein, with the assistance of Attorney B., who was also the station commander of the police precinct, he executed an extrajudicial confession.

Issue: Whether A’s right to counsel during a custodial investigation was violated.

Held: Yes. The Constitution requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial investigations be competent and independent. Here, A was assisted by Attorney B., who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an “independent counsel” as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the police precinct at the time he assisted A. The independent counsel required by the Constitution cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.

Decision

PEOPLE VS. DOMINADOR ASPIRAS

G.R. NO. 121203 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with murder. Trial ensued. Judge B, who presided at the trial, was replaced by Judge C. Judge C rendered a decision finding A guilty of murder.

Issue: Whether the efficacy of the decision is impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial.

Held: No. Judge C, who took over the case from Judge B had the full record before him, including the transcript of stenographic notes, which he studied. The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are found in the transcript of stenographic notes taken in the case.

ELIGIO MADRID VS. CA

G.R. NO. 130683 (2000)

Facts: The RTC rendered a decision convicting A of the crime of homicide. The only discussion in the decision of the evidence is in the following sentences: “Their testimony convinced the Court. On the other hand, accused’s evidence bears the indicia of fabrication. Defense witnesses from their demeanor, manner of testifying and evasive answers were far from credible. From the evidence on record, the Court believes and so hold that the prosecution has satisfactory proved the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Prosecution’s witnesses testified in a straightforward manner.

Issue: Whether the RTC satisfied the constitutional standard of clear and distinct articulation of the facts and law in its decision

Held: No. The RTC’s decision, for all its length – 23 pages – contains no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusion. It contains nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties. It does not indicate what the trial court found in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to consider the same “straightforward”.

Demurrer to evidence

RESOSO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

319 SCRA 238 (1999)

Facts: Seven informations for falsifications of public document  were filed with the Sandiganbayan against P. Trial proceeded. With leave of court, P filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that by evidence presented by the prosecution itself the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt, and he is entitled to an acquittal. The Demurrer to Evidence was denied. P filed a petition for certitorari with the SC, challenging the denial of the demurrer.

Issue: Whether the petition should be granted

Held: No. P would have this Court review the assessment made by the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the evidence against him at this time of the trial. Such a review cannot be secured in a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus which is not available to correct mistakes in the judge’s findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact. Although there may be an error of judgment in denying the demurrer to evidence, this cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari, as certiorari does not include the correction or evaluation of evidence.

Double jeopardy

PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO MAGAT

G.R. NO. 130026 (2000)

Facts: On the basis of a void plea bargaining, the RTC rendered a judgment convicting A of the crime of rape. Thereafter, the cases were revived at complainant’s instance on the ground that the penalty was too light. Trial ensued and the RTC convicted A of rape and sentenced him to the penalty of death.

Issue: Whether there has been double jeopardy.

Held: No. The judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment of conviction rendered against A is void, double jeopardy will not lie.

 

Information

PEOPLE VS. FELIXBERTO

G.R. NO. 134130-33 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with the crime of rape. The information alleged that he is the stepfather of the victim. The trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.

Issue: Whether the penalty imposed on A is correct.

Held: No. Although the rape of a person under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on A in these cases because this relationship was not what was alleged in the information. What was alleged was that he is the stepfather of the complainants.

PEOPLE VS. BENJAMIN RAZONABLE

G.R. NO. 128085 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with the crime of rape. The Information alleged that the offense was committed “sometime in the year 1987”. A was convicted of rape. On appeal, he raised the issue of a defective information on the ground that it did not state the approximate time of the commission of the offense.

Issue: Whether the said objection may be made for the first time on appeal.

Held: No. It behooved the accused to raise the issue of a defective information, on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, in a motion to quash said information or a motion for bill of particulars. An accused who fails to take this seasonable step will be deemed to have waived the defect in the said information. The only defects in an information that are not deemed waived are where no offense is charged, lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and double jeopardy. Corollarily, objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.

PEOPLE VS. EUSEBIO TRAYA

G.R. NO. 129052 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with the crime of rape. The information did not state the fact of the minority of the victim. A was convicted of rape and sentenced to death.

Issue: Whether the penalty imposed on A is correct, considering the fact of the minority of the victim was not stated in the Information.

Held: The fact of the minority of the victim was not stated in the Information. Only the relationship of the victim as the daughter of the offender was alleged therein. The rule is that the elements of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. The failure to allege one of these elements precludes the imposition of the death penalty.

PEOPLE VS. DOMINICO LICANDA

G.R. NO. 134084 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with the crime of rape. The information did not allege A’s use of a bladed weapon in committing rape. A was convicted of rape and sentenced to death. One basis for the court’s imposition of the death penalty was A’s use of a bladed weapon in committing rape.

Issue: Whether the penalty imposed on A is correct, considering that the use of a bladed weapon by A was not alleged in the information.

Held: No. A’s use of a bladed weapon in committing rape cannot serve as basis for the imposition of the death penalty. This circumstance, which under Art. 335, increases the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, must be so alleged in the Information.

PEOPLE VS. ROSENDO MENDEZ

G.R. NO. 132546 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with rape. The complaint specifically accused A of rape committed “by means of force.” The information alleged that the carnal intercourse was “against the will” or “without the consent” of the victim.

Issue: Whether the complaint prevails in case of variance between the victim’s complaint and the information in crimes against chastity.

Held: Yes. In case of variance between the victim’s complaint and the information in crimes against chastity, the complaint control. Thus, the failure of the information to state that A raped X “through force or intimidation” is not a fatal omission in this case because the complaint alleged the ultimate fact that A raped X “by means of force”. So, at the outset, A could have readily ascertained that he was being accused rape committed through force, a charge that sufficiently complies with Article 335.

PEOPLE VS. PETRONILLO CASTILLO

G.R. NO. 130205 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with rape. The information alleged that the crime occurred “sometime in May 1991”.

Issue: Whether the information is too general in terms.

Held: No. The information charges only one offense – that committed in May 1991.It cannot be said that A was deprived of the opportunity to prepare for his defense. It is sufficient if the time averred is near the actual date as the information of the prosecuting officer will permit, and since that was done in this case, it was not shown that the time proved did not surprise or substantially prejudice the defense. Besides, in a rape case, the date or time is not an essential crime and therefore need not be accurately stated.

Motion to quash

WILLIAM GARAYGAY VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 135503 (2000)

Facts: The Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila issued a search warrant authorizing the search of A’s house in Lapu-Lapu City. By virtue of the warrant, A’s house was searched. A filed in the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City a motion to quash the search warrant and to exclude illegally seized evidence.

Issue: Whether the motion to quash should have been filed with the RTC of Manila which issued the warrant.

Held: No. When a search warrant is issued by one court, if the criminal case by virtue of the warrant is raffled off to a branch other than the one which issued the warrant, all incidents relating to the validity of the warrant should be consolidated with the branch trying the criminal case.

Plea bargaining

PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO MAGAT

G.R. NO. 130026 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with the crime of rape. Upon arraignment, A pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser offense, to which complainant’s mother and the prosecutor agreed.

Issue: Whether the plea bargaining is valid.

Held: No. The only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense. Here, A did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed.

Plea of guilty

PEOPLE VS. EFREN JABIEN

G.R. NO. 133068-69 (2000)

Facts: A was charged with the crime of rape. He pleaded guilty to the same and did not present evidence for the defense. The RTC rendered judgment and found A guilty beyond reasonable doubt. He was meted the death penalty

Issue: Whether the plea of guilty to a capital offense is valid.

Held: Yes. The Rules of Court provide the procedure that the trial court should follow when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and precise degree of culpability. Here, A was neither coerced nor intimidated in entering his plea of guilty. Furthermore, his guilt was proved by the evidence presented by the prosecution.

Procedural errors

PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO MAGAT

G.R. NO. 130026 (2000)

Facts: On the basis of a void plea bargaining, the RTC rendered a judgment convicting A of the crime of rape. Thereafter, the cases were revived at complainant’s instance on the ground that the penalty was too light. At his re-arraignment, A pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued and the RTC convicted A of rape and sentenced him to the penalty of death.

Issue: Whether the procedural errors in the first arraignment can be questioned.

Held: No. Whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of A was rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea. A did not question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so, he is deemed to have abandoned his right to question the same and waived the errors in procedure.

Search warrants

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE VS. JUDGE TAYPIN

G.R. NO. 134217 (2000)

Facts: P sought nullification of a search warrant issued by respondent court on the ground that the respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense since it was not delegated as a special court for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and that the application for search warrant should have been dismissed since it was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping.

Issue: Whether the search warrant should be nullified on the said grounds.

Held: No. The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts. Administrative Order No. 113-95 merely specified which court could try and decide cases involving violations of IPR. It did not, and could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all matters (including the issuance of search warrants and other judicial processes) in any one court. Jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive law; in this case, BP Blg. 129, and not by procedural rule.

            With respect to the lack of a certification of non-forum shopping, the Rules of Court as amended requires such certification only from initiatory pleadings, omitting any mention of “applications.”

Suspension of criminal proceedings

FIRST PRODUCERS HOLDINGS VS. CO

G.R. NO. 139655 (2000)

Facts: X filed a criminal complaint for estafa and perjury against A. It appears that A refused to return certificates of shares owned by X and even executed false affidavits of loss despite the fact that said certificates are existing and remains in his possession. During the pendency of the case, A filed an action for damages against X and claimed ownership over the questioned certificates. A filed a motion for suspension of the criminal case on the ground of a prejudicial question but was denied by the trial court.

Issue: Whether the motion for suspension of the criminal case should be granted.

Held: No. The peculiar circumstances of this case clearly show that it was merely a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal case. The criminal action for estafa has been lodged with the Prosecutor on March 13. Yet, A filed the civil case only 8 months later. The dilatory character of the strategy of respondent is apparent from the fact that he could have raised the issue of ownership in the estafa case. Significantly, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action. Hence, A may invoke all defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal action. In fact, there is no law or rule prohibiting him from airing exhaustively the question of ownership.

Youthful Offender

                      

PEOPLE VS. LUDIGARIO CANDELARIO

G.R. NO. 125550 (2000)

Facts: P, a youthful offender, who was 18 years and 11 months at the time the crime was committed, was convicted and placed under the custody of the DSWD Rehabilitation Center. In a Final Report, the Field Office Director of the DSWD recommended to the Court that his case be dismissed and his custody be transferred to his father for his best welfare and interest.

Issue: Whether the youthful offender should be discharged on the basis of the said recommendation.

Held: No. The said Final Report and Recommendation of the DSWD should be referred to the RTC for its approximate action and disposition. In cases where the DSWD recommends the discharge of a youthful offender, it is the trial court before whom the report and recommendation is subject to judicial review. Recommendation alone is not sufficient the release of a youthful offender. In reviewing the DSWD’s conclusions but should seek out concrete, material and relevant facts to confirm that the youthful offender has indeed been reformed and is ready to re-enter society as a productive and law-abiding citizen.

Summary Procedure

LUCAS V. JUDGE FABROS

31 Jan. 2000

Facts:  The civil case involving P and D was dismissed for failure of P and his counsel to appear at the preliminary conference. D then complained because the judge granted P’s motion for reconsideration.

Issue:  Whether the judge was in error when she granted the motion for reconsideration

Held:   No. As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Sec. 19 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. Here, the order of dismissal is not a judgment on the merits of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Sec. 19 of the rule on Summary Procedure.

DON TINO REALTY V. FLORENTINO

10 Sept. 1999

Facts:  In a forcible entry case, D was not able to file his answer on time. The MTC disregarded his answer and ruled against him. D appealed the unfavorable judgment.

Issue:  Whether MTC should have admitted D’s answer

Held:   No. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. The MTC’s decision was in accordance with the rule on Summary Procedure.

IN RE: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. MTJ-99-1181

11 Aug. 1999

Facts:  In an ejectment case, D’s counsel filed a motion for intervention in behalf of D’s children. P opposed the motion because interventions are prohibited under Sec. 19 of the Rule on Summary Procedure. The judge took 4 months to decide the patently improper motion for intervention so P filed a letter-complaint against the judge.

Issue:  Whether the judge’s actions were excusable

Held: No. Considering that the motion for intervention is prohibited in cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the resolution of the motion should not have taken such an unreasonably long period. Delay in the resolving motions is inexcusable and cannot be condoned.

VELAYO V. COMELEC

9 March 2000

Facts:  P filed a number of pre-proclamation cases against D. These were dismissed and D was proclaimed winner.  P moved for reconsideration without furnishing D a copy of the motion. D was also not furnished a copy of the Order elevating the case to the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC then annulled the proclamation of D.

Issue:  Whether the COMELEC proceedings were properly conducted

Held:   No. It is true that RA 7166 provides for summary proceedings in pre-proclamation cases and does not require a trial-type hearing. Nevertheless, summary proceedings cannot be stretched to mean ex parte proceedings. Summary simply means with dispatch, with the least possible delay. But although the proceedings are summary, the adverse party must at the very least be notified so that he can be apprised of the nature and the purpose of the proceeding. In this case, all the proceedings were conducted without the participation of D. These ex parte proceedings offend fundamental fairness and are null and void.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Attachment

GARCIA V. JOMOUAD

26 Jan. 2000

Facts:  Creditors of D attached a Property Ownership Certificate in D’s name. P objected to the levy claiming that he merely lent the certificate to D and that D executed a Deed of Transfer in favor of P even prior to the attachment.

Issue:  Whether there was proper attachment of the shares

Held:   Yes. The unrecorded transfer of shares is invalid as to the attaching or execution creditors of the assignors. Entry in the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors does not constitute proper recording of the transfer. The transfer must be recorded in the books of the corporation in order to bind subsequent attaching or execution creditors.

 

Certiorari/Appeal

ABBOTT LABORATORIES V. ABBOTT LAB EMPLOYEES

26 Jan. 2000

Facts:  The Bureau on Labor Relations declared D to be a legitimate labor organization. P appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Issue:  Whether appeal is the proper remedy

Held:   No. The decisions of the Bureau on Labor Relations on case brought before it on appeal from the Regional Director are final and executory. The remedy is to avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Even if the present action were considered as a petition for certiorari, it is still time-barred. P filed the petition after the lapse of more than 4 months from the notice of judgment, clearly beyond the 60-day period provided under Sec. 4 of Rule 65.

CONDO SUITE V. NLRC

28 Jan. 2000

Facts:  Labor Arbiter dismissed P’s complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC reversed and ordered reinstatement. Employer D filed a petition for certiorari. However, B did not impute lack or excess of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC.

Issue:  Whether the petition for certiorari may prosper even without allegations of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion

Held:   No. Resort to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. The respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case. There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law. And there is grave abuse of discretion where the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner n the exercise of his judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Since D neither assailed the jurisdiction of the NLRC nor attributes grave abuse of discretion, his petition must fail.

SMI DEV’T. V. RP

28 Jan. 2000

Facts:  RP filed a complaint for eminent domain against D for the purpose of expropriating D’s land. P filed a Motion to Dismiss and trial court granted the motion. RP filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of filing an appeal.

Issue:  Whether certiorari is the correct remedy

Held:   Yes. Indeed, certiorari may not be resorted to when appeal is available as a remedy. However, the Court allows the issuance of a writ of certiorari when appeal does not provide a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The determination as to what exactly constitutes a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy rests on judicial discretion and depends on the particular circumstances of each case. In this case, the public interest involved and the urgency to provide medical facilities were enough justifications for RP’s resort to certiorari.

TANG V. CA

11 Feb. 2000

Facts:  P, the administrator of an estate, sought to fence 2 lots. D et al. opposed the issuance of the fencing permit claiming that the subject lots are street lots. Eventually, the fencing permit was issued. D et al., the neighboring lot owners filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction.

Issue:  Whether D et al. may validly avail of certiorari

Held:   No. Although Sec. 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a “person aggrieved” by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term “person aggrieved” is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition via certiorari. The “person aggrieved” referred to under Sec. 1 of Rule 65 pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. D et al. cannot be considered as “persons aggrieved;” the remedy of certiorari is not available to them.

 

Contempt

YASAY V. RECTO

7 Sept. 1999

Facts:  SEC declared D et al. guilty of contempt for disobeying a TRO that SEC issued. The CA set aside the order of the SEC, finding D et al. not guilty of contempt. SEC appealed the CA’s reversal.

Issue:  Whether the SEC can validly appeal the CA’s decision

Held:   No. Whether civil or criminal, contempt is still a criminal proceeding and an appeal would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt. Moreover, the SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for contempt. There was no willful disobedience of the SEC’s order since it was shown that the CA previously nullified the TRO.

Denial of a Motion to Dismiss

PEFIANCO V. MORAL

19 Jan. 2000

Facts:  D filed a mandamus and injunction case seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a decision which had already become final. P filed a Motion to Dismiss. The judge denied the motion without stating the basis why P’s motion should be denied.

Issue:  Whether the judge’s denial of the motion was proper

Held:   No. Rule 16 mandatorily requires that the resolution of a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. The rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to dismiss “for lack of merit.” The challenged order of the trial court falls short of the requirements stated in Rule 16.

Desistance

 

ENOJAS V. JUDGE GACOTT

19 Jan. 2000

Facts:  P filed an administrative case against Judge D. Later on, however, P withdrew his complaint.

Issue:  Whether the case should be dismissed in view of plaintiff’s desistance

Held:   No. Withdrawal of a complaint or subsequent desistance by the complainant in an administrative case does not necessarily warrant its dismissal. Desistance cannot divest the court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint against D for public interest is at stake.

 

Forum Shopping

 

CONDO SUITE V. NLRC

28 Jan. 2000

Facts:  Labor Arbiter dismissed P’s complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC reversed and ordered reinstatement. Employer D filed a petition for certiorari. The external legal counsel of D executed the certification against forum shopping in the petition.

Issue:  Whether there was proper compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping

Held:   No. B did not comply with the rule since the certification was improperly executed by the external legal counsel. A certification of non-forum shopping must be executed by the petitioner or any of the principal parties and not by counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so.

Interlocutory Order And Execution Pending Appeal

DIESEL CONSTRUCTION V. JOLLIBEE FOODS

28 Jan. 2000

Facts:  The trial court ruled that P was entitled to a certain amount to be paid by D. Both parties appealed. The CA directed the RTC to issue a writ of execution upon P’s posting of a P10 million bond and to stay execution D’s filing of a supersedeas bond of P15 million.

Issue:  Whether a petition for review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to question the CA’s resolution

Held:   No. Rule 45 is the proper remedy to question final judgments and not interlocutory orders of the CA. The assailed resolution is an interlocutory order. Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters which do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the improvident order granting execution [ending appeal or a stay of such execution.

BERNARDO CONSTRUCTION V. CA

31 Jan. 2000

Facts:  P filed a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance, and collection of a sum of money against D. The trial court issued the writ of preliminary attachment. D filed a petition for certiorari so CA reversed. P now assails the CA’s decision.

Issue:  Whether CA was correct in allowing due course to D’s petition for certiorari

Held:   No. As a general rule, an interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the merits. However, certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The present case does not fall under the exceptions because D still had recourse to a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, which is the filing of a motion to fix the counter-bond.

MACEDA V. DBP

26 Aug. 1999

Facts:  P won a case against D. D appealed and the trial court granted execution pending appeal. However, the CA reversed and denied execution pending the appeal of the case.

Issue:  Whether there are good reasons to justify execution pending appeal

Held:   No. Sec. 2, Rule 39 applies and his rule is strictly applied against the movant. Execution pending appeal is usually not favored because it affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal. The 3 requisites are: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and (3) the good reason must be stated in a special order. In this case, there are no special, important, or pressing reasons that would justify execution pending appeal.

Intervention

 

FIRESTONE CERAMICS V. CA

2 Sept. 1999

Facts:  The government filed a case to annul the certificate of title of D covering forestland. X wanted to intervene believing that if D’s title would be annulled and after declassification of the forestland to alienable land, then his title over a portion of the property would become valid. Y also wanted to intervene because the cancellation of D’s title would allegedly pave the way for his free patent application.

Issue:  Whether X and Y should be allowed to intervene.

Held:   No. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows that he is qualified to intervene as provided under Sec. 1 of Rule 19. The legal interest of the intervenor must be of direct and immediate character and not merely contingent or expectant so that he will either gain or lose by the direct operation of the judgment. X and Y merely have a collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation, thus, allowing intervention would not be justified.

Judgment

BALUYOT VS. GUIAO

September 28, 1999

Facts: P filed a case to declare null and void a donation of a piece of land against D.  P claimed ownership of the same.   After trial, the court declared the donation void and P the owner of the land and issued a writ of possession in favor of P.  D now appeals the judgment.  One of the errors assigned was that the court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of possession.

Issue:  Whether the writ of possession was issued in excess of jurisdiction.

Held:  Yes.

Judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto; and, where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated party’s claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.  Also, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim or ownership which was rejected.  In such case, writ of execution would be required if the defeated party does not surrender the possession of the property.  Here, there is no allegation, much less proof, that petitioners have any right to possess the land independent of their claim of ownership.

Liberal Construction Of Rules Of Procedure

 

BALAGTAS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. V. CA

16 Sept. 1999

Facts:  The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by P because “only the Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC and Financial Statement of P were attached but still without the other material documents mentioned in the petition, such as, (a) complaint, (b) position papers, and (c) resignation letter of private respondent.”

Issue:  Whether the CA erred in not finding sufficient compliance on the part of P with the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure

Held:   Yes. The submission of said financial statement together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46.  The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.

Litis Pendentia

TOURIST DUTY FREE SHOPS V. SANDIGANBAYAN

26 Jan. 2000

Facts:  P filed a case against D for reconveyance, reversion, and restitution of illegally obtained assets. C filed another case against P et al., with the Sandiganbayan for specific performance and the nullification of the writ of sequestration.

Issue:  Whether the second case should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia or consolidation with the first case

Held:   No. The requisites of litis pendentia are absent in this case (no identity of parties; no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for). The cases should be resolved independently because merger or consolidation of the two via mere motion is clearly unwarranted.

Modes Of Discovery

SECURITY BANK V. CA

25 Jan. 2000

Facts:  P filed a case against D & E to enjoin the extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage. The court granted E’s motions for production, inspection, copying of documents relating to the mortgage. P objected.

Issue:  Whether the court erred in allowing the modes of discovery

Held:   No. Courts are given wide latitude in granting motions for discovery. Courts should allow production of documents that are relevant to the subject matter of the action. To enable a party to intelligently prepare his defenses and to come up with a full determination of the issues constitute good causes for the grant of motions for production of documents.

 

New Trial

OLAN V. CA

10 Sept. 1999

Facts:  D lost in an ejectment case. The RTC allowed execution pending appeal. D filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and attached thereto the alleged “newly discovered evidence.” The RTC denied the motion and D complained because his newly discovered evidence was not considered by the court.

Issue:  Whether the newly discovered evidence should be admitted

Held:   No. D should have filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence in accordance with Rule 37. D also failed to support his claim affidavits showing that (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material and if admitted, it will probably change the judgment.

Pre-trial And Extrinsic Fraud

ALARCON V. CA

28 Jan. 2000

Facts:  P filed a case for the nullification of the sale of his land to D, E, and F. During pre-trial, all the parties agreed and manifested that the document of sale was void so the trial court declared the document of sale to be void ab initio. D filed a petition to annul the decision.

Issue:  Whether the petition for annulment of the decision would prosper

Held:   No. First, there was no extrinsic fraud to merit annulment of the decision. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic when it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. Counsel properly represented D at all stages of the proceedings and he was not deprived of having a trial.

            Second, an action based on fraud must be filed within 4 years from discovery thereof. B filed the petition 9 years from the rendition of the assailed judgment.

            Finally, pre-trial is mandatory. Entering into a stipulation of facts or admissions of facts expedites trial and relieves parties and the court of the costs of proving facts that will not be disputed during trial. Stipulations of facts made in the pre-trial hearing are binding on the parties. Based on the clear admissions made by the parties, D cannot now claim that he was denied his day in court.

 

Prejudicial Question

CITY OF PASIG V. COMELEC

10 Sept. 1999

Facts:  COMELEC suspended the plebiscite scheduled for the creation of new barangays in Municipality P in view of the pending boundary dispute between Municipality P and Municipality D. Municipality P objected.

Issue:  Whether there is a prejudicial question

Held:   Yes. The general rule is that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play when both cases are civil. However, in the interest of good order, the Supreme Court can suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first even if the two are both civil cases. The exception applies in this case.

Real Party-In-Interest

BORLONGAN V. MADRIDEO

25 Jan. 2000

Facts:  P and D occupied X’s lot. P filed an unlawful detainer case against D claiming that she is the sole lessee and that D’s possession was by mere tolerance of P. X, the owner of the lot, testified that both P and D were rightful lessees.

Issue:  1. Who has the burden of proof?

            2. Whether P is the real party-in-interest

Held:   1. P has the burden of proof. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff who is the party asserting the affirmative of an issue. However, P failed to meet the burden, as she was unable to substantiate her claim that she is the sole lessee of the property.

            2. P is not the real party-in-interest. A “real party-in-interest” is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Since P failed to prove that she is the sole lessee of the property, P cannot be the real party-in-interest in the unlawful detainer case.

UY V. CA

9 Sept. 1999

Facts:  A and B were agents authorized to sell a parcel of land. They filed a case in their own name against a third party for breach of contract involving the land they were supposed to sell. The principals of A and B were not pleaded as party-plaintiffs, Thus, their complaint was dismissed on the ground that they were not the real parties-in-interest.

Issue:  Whether A and B can be considered as real parties-in-interest

Held:   No. Sec. 2, Rule 3 requires that every action be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. The agents are not parties to the said contract based on the principles of agency. Neither are they heirs of the principal, assignees, or beneficiaries of a stipulation pour autrui. Thus, A and B are not the real parties-in-interest in this case.

Res Judicata

GREENFIELD  REALTY CORP. V. CARDAMA

25 Jan. 2000

Facts:  P filed a case against D. A similar case involving the parties had been previously dismissed for the case was amicably settled. D said the present action is barred by res judicata.

Issue:  Whether res judicata applies

Held:   No. Indeed, judgment upon a compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata. However, there is no res judicata when the cause of action arises from the application or violation of the compromise agreement.

VAN NGHIA V. RODIGUEZ

31 Jan. 2000

Facts:  A, a foreigner, was previously deported and barred from again entering the Philippines. However, A was able to enter the country again so he was arrested and charged with violating the Phil. Immigration Act. A filed a petition for habeas corpus but it was denied. His fiancée filed another petition for habeas corpus on A’s behalf.

Issue:  Whether res judicata applies

Held:   Yes. This is already the second petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner before the courts. There is res judicata when (1) a judgment had become final; (2) such judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) such judgment was rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action in the previous and subsequent actions. The present petition alleges the same matters and cause of action as the one previously filed. Clearly, it is barred by res judicata.

 

Service Of Summons

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY V. CAOIBES

19 Aug. 1999

Facts:  In a civil case, D filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that his answer previously filed be treated as his answer to the amended complaint. However, the court considered the motion as not filed on the ground of non-compliance with Sec. 13 of Rule 13.

Issue:  Whether the court erred in not accepting the motion

Held:   Yes. Although A failed to comply with the required proof of service, it is worthy to note that A ‘s Motion and Manifestation is not a contentious motion and therefore, no right of the adverse party would be affected by the admission thereof. The filing of said motion was not even necessary since the Answer previously filed by A could serve as the Answer to the Amended Complaint even if no motion to admit was filed, as provided in Sec. 3 of Rule 11.

Staying The Immediate Execution Of Judgment

LAPEÑA V. PAMARANG

15 Feb. 2000

Facts:  P won in an unlawful detainer case. A writ of execution was issued and was delivered to sheriff D for execution. However, sheriff D returned the writ “duly served but not satisfied.”

Issue:  Whether sheriff’s action was proper

Held:   No. To stay the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case while appeal is pending, the defendant must: (a) perfect his appeal; (b) file a supersedeas bond; and (c) periodically deposit the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. Mere filing of a notice of appeal does not stay execution in an ejectment case. It does not appear from sheriff D’s return that the requisites were present so as to justify his desistance from implementing the writ of execution. 

Substitution Of Counsel

OBANDO V. FIGUERAS

18 Jan. 2000

Facts:  In a civil case, D filed a motion to dismiss and this was granted. P claimed that the motion to dismiss is invalid since at the time of filing, Atty. Y no longer represented D.

Issue:  Whether or not Atty. Y ceased to be D’s counsel

Held:   No. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in accordance with Sec. 26, Rule 138. Counsel may be validly substituted only if the following requisites are complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application for substitution; (2) the client’s written consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured, if it can still be; if the written consent can no longer be obtained, then the application for substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion has been served on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the rules.

OBANDO V. FIGUERAS

18 Jan. 2000

Facts:  In a civil case, D filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that P lost his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case. P assailed the motion, saying that it was too late since P had already finished presenting his evidence.

Issue:  Whether the motion to dismiss should be granted

Held:   Yes. The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case. Sec. 1 of Rule 16 requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. But the court allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the ff. grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) litis pendentia; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.

Substitution Of Parties

BENAVIDEZ V. CA

6 Sept. 1999

Facts:  P filed a forcible entry case against D. P won. D assailed the ruling for he claimed that during the pendency of the case, P died and P’s counsel failed to inform the court thereof. D contended that such failure to inform nullifies the court’s judgment.

Issue:  Whether or not D is correct

Held:   D is wrong. The failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Sec. 16 Rule 3 to inform the court of the death of his client (and as a consequence, no substitution of parties is effected) will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. An action for forcible entry, like any action for recovery of real property, is a real action and as such survives the death of P.

 

Summary Judgment

GARCIA V. CA

10 Aug. 1999

Facts:  P filed a case against D for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. P moved for summary judgment and later on, D also moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the same. The trial court ruled in favor of P but the CA reversed. P argued that the CA committed an error believing that he alone as plaintiff in the trial court is entitled to summary judgment.

Issue:  Whether the P’s reasoning is correct

Held:   No. Under Rule 34, either party may move for summary judgment – the claimant by virtue of Sec. 1 and the defending party by virtue of Sec. 2. There was no error on the part of the court in resorting to summary judgment as prayed for by both parties.

Summons

E. B. VILLAROSA V. BENITO

6 Aug. 1999

Facts:  P filed a case against D for breach of contract. D is a limited partnership. Summons were served upon D through its Branch Manager X. D filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person because summons were improperly served. The trial court denied D’s motion.

Issue:  Whether there was proper service of summons

Held:   No. The enumeration of persons (provided under Sec. 11 Rule 14) upon whom summons may be served to bind a domestic corporation or partnership is restricted, limited, and exclusive. Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in the Rule is improper. The branch manager is not included in the list so service of summons upon him was improper. Consequently, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of D.

Writ Of Execution

VOLUNTAD V. DIZON

26 Aug. 1999

Facts:  There was a pending case concerning a parcel of land. P caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title. The notice, however, was prematurely cancelled. IN the meantime, D sold the land to X. P won the case sought to execute the judgment against X.

Issue:  Whether the judgment may be executed against X

Held:   Yes. A writ of execution may be issued against a person not a party to the case where the latter’s remedy, which he did not avail of, was to intervene in the case involving rights over the parcel of land of which he claims to be the vendee. Since the notice of lis pendens was only prematurely cancelled, X should have been aware of the pendency of the case and should have intervened in the suit to protect his alleged rights. Having failed to do so, X is bound by the result of the case.

 

TERRY V. PEOPLE

16 Sept. 1999

Facts:  On August 13, 1979, the CFI rendered a decision for which, no appeal was made. On November 22, 1979, a writ of execution was issued against P. However, the writ was not served on P. On December 9, 1985, the court, issued an alias writ of execution.

Issue:  Whether the writ of execution was validly issued

Held:   No. The rule is that the court could issue a writ of execution by motion within five (5) years from finality of the decision, which in this case was in 1979. A writ of execution issued after the expiration of that period is null and void. There is a need for the interested party to file an independent action for revival of judgment.

Accion publiciana

DOMINICA CUTANDA VS. HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA

G.R. NO. 109215 (2000)

Facts: D’s predecessor-in-interest, X, acquired possession of a parcel of land in 1933. In 1988, P filed a complaint against D for recovery of possession of said land.

Issue: Whether P’s cause of action was barred.

Held: Yes. The remedies of accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria must be availed of within 10 years from dispossession. Hence, insofar as D is concerned, P’s cause of action was barred by extinctive prescription, regardless of whether their complaint is considered as an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.

Amended and supplemental complaint

ARB CONSTRUCTION CO. VS. CA

G.R. NO. 126554 (2000)

Facts: P filed a Complaint for Preliminary Injunction against D. Thereafter, P filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached Amended and Supplemental Complaint. P submitted that it now desired to pursue a case for Sum of money and Damages instead of the one previously filed for Preliminary Injunction. D opposes the Motion.

Issue: Whether the Amended and Supplemental Complaint would substantially change P’s cause of action

Held: No. The amendatory allegations are mere amplifications of the cause of action if the facts alleged in the amended complaint show substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if what are alleged refer to the same subject matter but are fully and differently stated, or where averments which were implied are made in expressed terms, and the subject of the controversy or the liability sought to be enforced remains the same. Here, the original as well as amended and supplemental complaints readily disclose that the averments contained therein are almost identical.

Amendment to conform to evidence

BERNARDO MERCADER VS. DBP

G.R. NO. 130699 (2000)

Facts: In its Pre-Trial Order, the RTC limited the issues to be resolved in the case to three issues. Thereafter, the plaintiff, P, filed a supplemental pleading that dealt with a new issue involving a lease-purchase option. D opposed the supplemental pleading

Issue: Whether the issue involving the lease-purchase option was properly raised in the pleadings

Held: Yes. Said issue was raised in the supplemental pleading subsequently filed by P. As a supplemental pleading, it served to aver supervening facts which were then not ripe for judicial relief when the original pleading was filed. As such, it was meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading, and not to dispense with the latter.

BERNARDO MERCADER VS. DBP

G.R. NO. 130699 (2000)

Facts: During the trial, the counsel of D participated in the direct and cross-examination of witnesses whose testimonies included an issue not among those appearing in the Pre-Trial Order. The RTC ruled on the said issue. D questions the RTC’s inclusion of the said issue in its ruling.

Issue: Whether the said issue should be decided by the RTC

Held: Yes. D is estopped from questioning the RTC’s inclusion of said issue by its participation in the direct and cross-examination of witnesses whose testimonies included said topic.

BERNARDO MERCADER VS. DBP

G.R. NO. 130699 (2000)

Facts: During the trial, P offered evidence on an issue not alleged in the pleadings. D objected to the introduction of such evidence.

Issue: Whether the RTC may admit the evidence

Held: Yes. When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence. Of course, the court, before allowing the evidence, as a matter of formality, should allow an amendment of the pleading.

Appeal

UNITED AIRLINES VS. UY

318 SCRA 576

Facts: The RTC ordered the dismissal of an action. P filed a timely motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion and P received the denial order on 28 September. 2 days later, P filed a notice of appeal. The appellate court gave due course to the appeal.

Issue: Whether the appellate court erred in assuming jurisdiction over P’s appeal since it is clear that the notice of appeal was filed out of time.

Held: No. Delay in the filing of a notice of appeal does not justify the dismissal of the appeal where the circumstances of the case show that there is no intent to delay the administration of justice on the part of appellant’s counsel, or when there are no substantial rights affected, or when appellant’s counsel committed a mistake in the computation of the period of appeal, an error not attributable to negligence or bad faith.

FILIPINA SY VS. CA

G.R. NO. 127263 (2000)

Facts: P filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to D on the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, P raised the issue of the lack of a marriage license.

Issue: Whether P can raise this issue for the first time on appeal

Held: Yes. The general rule is that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal. However, the observance of this rule may be relaxed. Technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. The case at bar requires the Court to address the issue of the validity of the marriage which P claims is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license. Parenthetically, the pertinent facts here are not disputed and what is required is a declaration of their effects according to existing law.

JOSE OROSA VS. CA

G.R. NO. 111080 (2000)

Facts: The RTC dismissed P’s complaint against D. On appeal, P raised for the first time issues which were not raised in the orginal complaint.

Issue: Whether P can raise issues for the first time appeal

Held: No. Meritorious as P’s new arguments are, they came too late in the day. Basic is the rule that matters not raised in the complaint cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

EDGARDO MANCENIDO VS CA

G.R. NO. 118605 (2000)

                               

Facts: The RTC rendered a decision in favor of P. D filed a notice of appeal. However, D served the notice of appeal upon P, and not upon P’s counsel of record. The lower court gave due course to such appeal.

Issue: Whether D perfected their appeal

Held: No. The Rules of Court provide that service of notice when a party is represented by counsel should be made upon counsel, and not upon the party.

EDGARDO MANCENIDO VS. CA

G.R. NO. 118605 (2000)

Facts: D filed a notice of appeal in the RTC but failed to serve the notice of appeal upon P’s counsel. P filed his own notice of appeal. The RTC recalled the order granting D’s appeal and approved the appeal of P. D filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition and injunction with the Court of Appeals with prayer that their notice of appeal be given due course. The Court of Appeals granted the petition for mandamus and ordered the judge to elevate the original record of the case to it “in due course of appeal.”

Issue: Whether the order of the Court of Appeals was correct

Held: Yes. P did appeal the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals within the reglamentary period to perfect an appeal. Once a written notice of appeal is filed, appeal is perfected and the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and subject of the case.

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE CO. VS. PABLO BONDAD

G.R. NO. 136722 (2000)

Facts: P filed a Petition for Review to the Supreme Court of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a case involving a vehicular accident. Said Petition raises questions regarding the cause of the accident and the persons responsible for it.

Issue: Whether such questions can be reviewed by the Supreme Court

Held: No. Such questions are factual issues which the Supreme Court cannot pass upon. As a rule, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to a review of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. True, there are instances when this Court may review factual issues, but P has failed to demonstrate why his case falls under any of them. There is no contrariety between the findings of the trial court and those of the CA as to what and who had caused the accident.

SPOUSES JUAN DIAZ VS. JOSE DIAZ

G.R. NO. 135885 (2000)

Facts: In his Complaint, P alleged that he was entitled to receive P15,000 as his share in the sales proceeds of a co-owned property. He thereafter claimed that, with his knowledge and without his objection, the same P15,000.00 was used by his brother. Having allowed his brother to use his money, P demanded the return of the present equivalent of his contribution but said demand was rejected.

Issue: Whether the complaint states a cause of action

Held: Yes. According to jurisprudence, a complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. In the case at bar, the complaint satisfies all the elements of a cause of action.

SPOUSES JUAN DIAZ VS. JOSE DIAZ

G.R. NO. 135885 (2000)

Facts: P filed an action for sum of money with the RTC. D filed a motion to dismiss, to which the RTC denied. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Dissatifsied, D filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Said petition was dismissed on the ground that a special civil action for certiorari is not the appropriate remedy to question the denial of their motion to dismiss.

Issue: Whether a special civil action for certiorari is the appropriate remedy to question a denial of a motion to dismiss

Held: No. A special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. To justify the grant of such extraordinary remedy, the abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. In this case, no such circumstances attended the denial of petitioners’ motion to dismiss.

SPOUSES JUAN DIAZ VS. JOSE DIAZ

G.R. NO. 135885 (2000)

Facts: P received on January 22 a copy of the RTC, denying reconsideration of its ruling on their Motion to dismiss. P filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals on February 6. During the pendency of P’s Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the RTC declared P in default for failure to file an answer on or before January 27.

Issue: Whether the order of default is correct

Held: Yes. P had only five days from receipt of the order of the RTC, or until January 27, within which to file an answer. When P filed their Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals on February 6, they were already in default. Hence, the filing of said Petition for Certiorari cannot be considered as having interrupted the reglamentary period for filing an answer. More importantly, the Rules of Court provide that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

Cause of action

VIEWMASTER VS. ALLEN ROXAS

G.R. NO. 133576 (2000)

Facts: D failed to comply with his obligation with P. P filed with the RTC a complaint for specific performance. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action

Issue: Whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Held: No. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or  not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof.

Certificate of non-forum shopping

MELO VS. CA

318 SCRA 94 (1999)

Facts: P filed a complaint for injunction against D. In turn, D moved to dismiss P’s action on the ground of failure of D to attach a certification of non-forum shopping to her complaint. P argued that failure to comply with this requirement can be excused by the fact that it is not guilty of forum shopping.

Issue: Whether the failure to comply with the requirement should be excused.

Held: No. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. Every party filing a complaint or any other intitiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not committed nor will he commit forum shopping. Otherwise, we would have an absurd situation where the parties themselves would be the judge of whether their action constitute a violation of Circular 04-94.

BA SAVINGS BANK VS. ROGER SIA

G.R. NO. 131214 (2000)

Facts: Corporation A filed a Petition for Certiorari. The certification on anti-forum shopping was signed by Corp. A’s counsel. Corp A. was able to show that its Board of Directors authorized its lawyers to sign, execute and deliver the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Petition was denied on the ground that Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 “requires that it is the petitioner, not the counsel, who must certify under oath to all of the acts and undertakings required therein.”

Issue: Whether Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 allows a corporation to authorize its counsel to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping for and on its behalf

Held: Yes. All acts within the powers of a corporation may be performed by agents of its selection. Here, the corporation’s board of directors issued a resolution specifically authorizing its lawyer to acts as their agents in any action or proceeding before the Supreme Court. The requirement of the Circular cannot be imposed on artificial persons, like corporations, for the simple reason that they cannot personally do the task themselves.

Certiorari

RAYMUNDO VS. CA

315 SCRA 494 (1999)

Facts: P did not attend the scheduled pre-trial conference because he was awaiting resolution of a motion previously filed. Because of his non-appearance, the RTC declared P as in default and allowed D to present his evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision adverse to P. P filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari challenging the validity of the RTC’s decision and other proceedings.

Issue: Whether certiorari here is proper even where appeal is available.

Held: Yes. An ordinary appeal is the proper remedy in questioning a judgment by default; appeal is also the proper remedy from an order denying a petition for relief of judgment. Hence, in the normal course of events, the CA correctly denied the petition for certiorari before it, assailing the RTC’s decision by default and denial of the petition for relief, in view of the availability of appeal therefrom. However, in the exceptional circumstances presented in this case, appeal seems to be inadequate; consequently, even if petitioner interposed an appeal, certiorari lies to correct such a despotic exercise of discretion.

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMIN. VS. CA

318 SCRA 255 (1999)

Facts: The CA rendered a Resolution dated 28 June. P received the said Decision on 04 March. Thus P had until 19 March within which to perfect its appeal but did not do so. What it did was to file an original action for certiorari before the SC, reiterating the issues and arguments it raised before the CA.

Issue: Whether the action for certiorari was proper.

Held: No. The Resolution of the CA has already become final and executory by reason of P’s failure to appeal. Instead of filing this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, P should have filed a timely petition for review under Rule 45. There is no doubt that the CA has jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before it by P.

            The appeal from a final disposition of the CA is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rules 65 of the 1999 Rules of Court. Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final order or resolution of the CA in any case, regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the SC by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Under Rule 45, the reglementary period to appeal is 15 days from notice of judgment or denial of a Motion for Reconsideration.

            For a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered “plain, speedy and adequate” if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. Here, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.

PAULINO VILLANUEVA VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 135098 (2000)

Facts: The RTC rendered a judgment against D. D appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s judgment. Motion for reconsideration was denied. P, the private complainant, then executed an affidavit of desistance. D filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court, contending that the requisites for the grant of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence having been substantially shown, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the RTC for new trial.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals committed error in refusing to grant a new trial

Held: No. The requisites for newly discovered evidence as a ground for a new trial are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. In the case at bar, the Affidavit of Desistance was executed several years after the Court of Appeals had affirmed the trial court’s decision and had denied D’s motion for reconsideration. It is settled that affidavits of desistance made by a witness after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant consideration.

 

Compulsory counterclaim

SPOUSES CLARO PONCIANO VS. JUDGE PARENTELA

G.R. NO. 133284 (2000)

Facts: P filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against D. D filed their Answer with compulsory counterclaim. P filed a motion to strike off the counterclaim for failure to comply with Adm. Circular No. 04-94 of the Supreme Court which requires an affidavit of no-forum shopping for all initiatory pleadings in all courts.

Issue: Whether a compulsory counterclaim should be accompanied with an affidavit of no-forum shopping

Held: No. The language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. The circular has not been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit, can only be approximately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for independent resolution except by the court where the main case is pending.

Court rulings

RUBEN SERRANO VS. NLRC

G.R. NO. 117040 (2000)

Facts: The SC reversed the doctrine formulated in a previous case and applied a new doctrine in the instant case. P, relying on the ruling in the previous case, contends that the new doctrine enunciated in the instant case should only be applied prospectively.

Issue: Whether a new doctrine should only be applied prospectively.

Held: No. P’s view of the principle of prospective application of new judicial doctrines would turn the judicial function into a mere academic exercise with the result that the doctrine laid down would be no more than a dictum and would deprive the holding in the case of any force.

Death of a party

ANG KEK CHEN VS. ANDRADE

318 SCRA 11 (1999)

Facts: The judge sent copies of the court’s order to D, who already died. D’s counsel filed an administrative case against the judge on the ground of serious inefficiency for her failure to take judicial notice of the death of D.

Issue: Whether the judge erred in failing to take judicial notice of D’s death.

Held: No. The duty of informing the court of the death of a party is on the counsel of the deceased. The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his client and to inform the court of the names and addresses of his legal representative or representatives. Thus, the judge cannot be blamed for sending copies of the orders to D.

HEIRS OF ELIAS LORILLA VS. CA

G.R. NO. 118655 (2000)

Facts: The RTC rendered judgment in favor of P. D’s counsel received a copy of the decision but did not interpose an appeal therefrom. A writ of execution was issued. The Heirs of P filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that D died before the RTC rendered its decision.

Issue: Whether the motion should be granted.

Held: No. D’s counsel failed in his duty to promptly inform the court of the death of his client, as the Rules require. As far as the RTC was concerned, until the Writ of Execution was issued, D continued to be represented by counsel of record and that upon service of a copy of the decision on said counsel, D was deemed to have been validly served notice of judgment. The failure of D’s counsel to serve notice on the court and the adverse parties regarding his client’s death binds the Heirs as much as D himself could be bound.

Docket fees

GABRIEL LAZARO VS. CA

G.R. NO. 137761 (2000)

                           

Facts: P obtained a favorable judgment in a civil action they filed against D. Thereafter, D appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the appeal was initially dismissed for their failure to pay the required docket fees within the prescribed period. Their appeal was later reinstated when their motion for reconsideration was granted.

Issue: Whether the reinstatement of D’s appeal is correct

Held: No. The Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides that appellate court docket and other lawful fees should be paid within the period for taking an appeal. Said rule is not merely directory. The payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. The failure of D to conform with the rules on appeal renders the judgment final and executory.

 

Ejectment suit or unlawful detainer action

HEIRS OF FERNANDO VINZONS VS. CA

315 SCRA 541 (1999)

Facts: An ejectment suit was filed by P against D in the MTC more than one year from the termination of the month-to-month lease some time before April 1988.

Issue: Whether the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: No. This case being one of unlawful detainer, it must have been filed within one year from the date of last demand with the MTC. Otherwise it is an accion publiciana cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. The rule is that the one-year period provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the last letter of demand to vacate.

ORO CAM VS. CA

319 SCRA 444 (1999)

Facts: An ejectment suit was filed. P is not named a party in the suit but is a co-lessee of the property. Judgmentin the ejectment suit was rendered.

Issue: Whether the judgment binds P.

Held: Yes. Judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit is binding not only upon the defendents in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if they are: a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant; c) transferees pendente lite; d) sublessee; e) co-lessee; or f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.

ANITA BUCE VS. CA

G.R. NO. 136913 (2000)

Facts: D leased to P a parcel of land. The lease terminated without any agreement for renewal being reached. P, however, still tendered checks representing rentals to D which the latter refused to accept. P filed with the RTC a complaint for specific performance with prayer for consignation. In his Answer with counterclaim, D did not include a prayer for the restoration of possession of the leased premises. The RTC ordered the ejectment of D in its Decision.

Issue: Whether the order of the RTC is correct

Held: No. True, after the lease terminated without any agreement for renewal being reached, P became subject to ejectment from the premises. However, D did not include in their Answer with counterclaim a prayer for the restoration of possession of leased premises. Neither did they file with the proper MTC an unlawful detainer suit against P after the expiration of the lease contract. Moreover, the issue of possession of the lease premises was not among the issues agreed upon by the parties.

Execution of judgment

VDA. DE SALANGA VS. HON. ALAGAR

G.R. NO. 134089 (2000)

Facts: The MTC rendered a decision adverse to P. P appealed the decision all the way to the SC. Meanwhile, execution proceedings were conducted on Ps’ property. Accordingly, a public auction sale proceeded with D emerging as the highest bidder. Certificates of Sale were issued to D. After the SC rendered a decision affirming the MTC’s decision, the RTC remanded the case to the MTC for proceedings on issues involving execution of its final judgment.

Issue: Whether the MTC can still act on P’s questions regarding the auction sale of its properties

Held: No. The execution of the MTC judgment has been partially satisfied with the issuance of the Certificates of Sale to D. Thus it can no longer act on P’s questions regarding the auction sale of its properties. The MTC loses jurisdiction over a case that has been partially satisfied.

UY VS. HON. SANTIAGO

G.R. NO. 131237 (2000)

Facts: An MTC decision was appealed to the RTC which affirmed the said decision. D filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the decision of the RTC. Meanwhile, P filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution Pending Appeal with the RTC. The RTC denied such motion.

Issue: Whether the motion should be granted

Held: Yes. Once the RTC has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under the Rules on Civil Procedure, be immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court.

 

Findings of fact of lower courts

RIZAL SURETY VS. CA

G.R. NO. 112360 (2000)

Facts: The RTC  made certain findings of facts in its decision against P. Said decision was affirmed by the CA. In his petition for review on certiorari before the SC, P wants the Court to re-examine some factual issues.

Issue: Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual findings of the CA

Held: No. Factual findings by the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by the SC, and the same carry even more weight when the CA has affirmed the findings of fact arrived at by the lower court.

Forum Shopping

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE VS. JUDGE TAYPIN

G.R. NO. 134 217 (2000)

Facts: P moved to quash the search warrant issued by J on the ground that the application for the search warrant was not accompanied by a certification of no-forum shopping.

Issue: Whether a certification of no- forum shopping is required in applications for search warrants

Held: No. The Rules of Court as amended require such certification only from initiatory pleadings, omitting any mention of “applications.”

P.E.Z.A. VS. HON. VIANZON

G.R. NO. 131020 (2000)

Facts: The RTC issued an order against P. P filed an appeal with the CA. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. P filed a Petition for Certiorari before the SC to question purely questions of law. D alleges P is guilty of forum shopping.

Issue: Whether P is guilty of forum shopping

Held: No. There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. Considering that P is questioning the CA’s ruling by virtue of a petition for certiorari to this Court on purely questions of law, P cannot be guilty of forum shopping. To rule otherwise would render nugatory P’s right to appeal the decision of the CA to the SC on purely questions of law.

MANUEL LEYSON, JR. VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. NO. 134990 (2000)

Facts: D committed a breach in his contract with P. P charged D with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombusdman. P also filed a collection case before the RTC against D.

Issue: Whether P committed forum-shopping

Held: No. Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It is readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper because the cause of action herein, i.e., violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts, is different from the cause of action in the case pending before the trial court which is collection of a sum of money plus damages.

Indigent party

TEOFILO MARTINEZ VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 132852 (2000)

Facts: P filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. He also filed a Motion to Litigate as Pauper attaching thereto supporting affidavits executed by P himself and by 2 ostensibly disinterested persons attesting to P’s eligibility to avail himself of this privilege. The CA denied the motion and directed P to remit the docket fees.

Issue: Whether P should be allowed to litigate as pauper

Held: Yes. P has complied with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court as a pauper. He has executed an affidavit attesting to the fact that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income of more than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real property, a hut, cannot be worth more than P10,000.00. He has also submitted a joint affidavit executed by X and Y who generally attested to the same allegations contained in petitioner’s own affidavit.

 

Judgment

RIZAL SURETY VS. CA

G.R. NO. 112360 (2000)

Facts: In an appealed case, the CA ruled on D’s insurable interest and compensability for the loss of certain objects. The SC affirmed the CA’s ruling. P filed a motion of reconsideration of the CA’s decision with the CA. The CA reconsidered its decision as regards interest.

Issue: Whether the rule on conclusiveness of judgment as regards D’s insurable interest.

Held: Yes. The rule on conclusiveness of judgment precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties based on a different claim or cause of action. Considering that D’s insurable interest and compensability for the loss of certain objects has been settled by the CA and the SC, the same can no longer be relitigated.

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT VS. NLRC

G.R. NO. 101723 (2000)

Facts: The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered judgment ordering X, Y and Z to pay P a sum of money. In the alias writ of execution issued subsequently, the LA ordered the sheriff to proceed against X and/or Y and Z. X sought to quash the writ of execution on the ground that it changed the tenor of the decision by making him solidarily liable with Y and Z.

Issue: Whether the writ of execution changed the tenor of the decision

Held: Yes. A solidary obligation cannot lightly be inferred. There is a soldary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires. In the dispositive portion of the LA, the word “solidary” does not appear. Nor can it be inferred from the fallo that the liability of X, Y and Z is solidary, thus their liability should merely be joint.

Katarungang Pambarangay

VALENCIDES VERCIDE VS. JUDGE PRISCILLA HERNANDEZ

A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1265 (2000)

Facts: P filed a case for recovery of possession of a piece of land against D. The case was filed in court without prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa since the parties do not reside in the same or adjacent barangays. Nevertheless, D raised as an affirmative defense the non-referral of the case to the Barangay and consequently, the judge dismissed the case

Issue: Whether the parties are required to submit their dispute involving real property to the Lupong Tagapamayapa

Held: No. PD 1508 is clear on this point. Where parties do not reside in the same city or municipality or in adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute involving real property to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.

Laches

JOSEFINA VILLANUEVA-MIJARES VS. CA

G.R. NO. 108921 (2000)

Facts: A left a parcel of land to his 8 children. B, one of the heirs, held the property in trust for his co-heirs. Several years after, the other co-heirs discovered that their shares had been purchased by B and sold in favor of B’s children. The other children of A filed an action for partition with annulment of documents and/or reconveyance and damages against B’s children.

Issue: Whether the action is already barred by laches.

Held: No. Laches is negligience or omission to assert a right witin a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. There is no absolute rule on what constitute laches. It is a creation of equity and applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s rights but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.  Here,  the other co-heirs could no be faulted for their failure to file a case since up to the age of majority, they believed and considered B their co-heir and administrator. It was only later that they became aware of the actionable betrayal of B.

Liberality of the rules

SPOUSES JUAN DIAZ VS. JOSE DIAZ

G.R. NO. 135885 (2000)

Facts: In an action to recover a sum of money, P was declared in default for his failure to file a timely answer.

Issue: Whether the order of default should be set aside.

                     

Held: Yes. Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that the Supreme Court is empowered to suspend its operation, or except a particular case from its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.

Mandamus

PILO MILITANTE VS. CA

G.R. NO. 107040 (2000)

Facts: NHA revalidated the demolition clearance to eject the squatters on P’s land. X, the NHA Project Manager, however, refused to implement the clearance to eject the squatters. P filed with the Court of Appeals, among other things, a petition for mandamus.

Issue: Whether P is entitled to a Writ of Mandamus

Held: No. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus. He failed to discharge this burden. The records show that there is no direct order from the NHA General Manager addressed to X to evict the squatters and demolish the shanties.

Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner. Here, P may seek another demolition order from the NHA General Manager this time addressed to X or the pertinent NHA representative.