G.R. No. 177152 January 6, 2010
We must reiterate that,
ultimately, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts
will generally not disturb the finding of the trial court unless it has plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. This is so because the trial court is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial.[17] Accused-appellant miserably failed to convince us that his case
presents an exception to this established rule.
Undeniably, the instant case
is one of statutory rape, the gravamen of which is the carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old. Sexual congress with a
girl under 12 years is always rape. Thus, force, intimidation or physical
evidence of injury is immaterial.[21]
Be that as it may, the
absence of struggle or an outcry from the victim is immaterial to the rape of a
child below 12 years of age. The law presumes
that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a
will of her own.[25]
Pertinently, we held in People v. Monteron[27] that:
...Not a few accused in rape cases have
attributed the charges brought against them to family feud, resentment, or
revenge. But such alleged motives have never swayed this Court from
lending full credence to the testimony of the complainant where she remains
steadfast in her direct and cross examination. Besides, no parent
would expose his or her own daughter to the shame and scandal of having
undergone such debasing defilement of her chastity if the charges were not
true. It is unnatural for a parent to use his own offspring as an engine of
malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even
stigma.
We, thus, sustain the conviction of
accused-appellant for the crime of statutory rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d)[32] of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).[33] The penalty of reclusion perpetua was likewise correctly imposed in accordance
with Article 266-B of the RPC.[34] The penalty for
statutory rape is reclusion perpetua, which being a single indivisible penalty, is
imposable regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the deed.[35]
G.R. No. 177295 January 6, 2010
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides
that the crime of rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances: (1) through force, threat or
intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and (4) when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present. In People v. Andaya,[25] it was held that “sexual
intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with the mental age of a
child below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape” with or without the
attendance of force, threat, or intimidation.
Moreover, we accord great weight and respect to the conclusion of
the trial court that AAA is “candid, sincere, straightforward and simple” in
her testimony as well as to the ruling of the appellate court that the alleged
flaws in her statements do not affect her credibility and veracity of her
testimony that the accused-appellant raped her, and that the defenses of denial
and alibi of the accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony
of AAA.
By well-entrenched jurisprudence, the issue of
credibility of witnesses is “a question best addressed to the province of the
trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while
testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts” and “[a]bsent
any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court's
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the
former's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are
shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have
affected the outcome of the case.”[26] In People v. Santos,[27] this policy has been emphasized as follows:
We
stress the well-settled doctrine that the lower court's assessment of the
credibility of a witness is accorded great respect owing to its direct
opportunity to observe the latter's demeanor during trial. In People v.
Ayuda, we held:
“It is doctrinally
settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court
has the advantage of observing the victim through the different indicators of
truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion,
the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant
answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it,
the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and
mien. ...” [Emphasis ours]
It has been stressed, moreover, that the bare denials and
uncorroborated alibis of an accused cannot overcome the positive identification
of the accused and straightforward recounting of the accused’s commission of a
crime. In People v. Nieto,[28] this Court held:
It is an established
jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support
it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the
identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to
him. The defense of alibi is likewise
unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such
defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is
unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a
credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper,
it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the
commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been
impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.
G.R. No. 189034 January 11, 2010
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
"Section 69. Nuisance
candidates. -- The
Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters
by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office
for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."
Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as “The Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987" provides in Section 5 thereof:
"SEC. 5. Procedure
in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. --
(a) A verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a
nuisance candidate under Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed
personally or through duly authorized representative with the Commission by any
registered candidate for the same office within five (5) days from the last day
for the filing of certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.
"(b) Within
three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and
its enclosures, if any.
"(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from
receipt of the summons within which to file his verified answer (not a motion
to dismiss) to the petition, serving copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be
raised as affirmative defenses.
"(d) The
Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the case
and receive evidence. The
proceeding shall be summary in nature. In
lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers
together with affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence.
The hearing officer shall immediately submit to the Commission his findings,
reports, and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of such
submission of evidence. The
Commission shall render its decision within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
"(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission
shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be
final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.
"(f) The
Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available means,
disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court to the city or
municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors and the general
public in the political subdivision concerned." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
"It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for
disqualification which clearly affects the voters' will and causes confusion
that frustrates the same. This
is precisely what election laws are trying to protect. They give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be observed
before any ballot is invalidated. Further,
in the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their
validity. (Silverio vs.
Castro, 19 SCRA 521 [1967]).
It is clear that Bautista is anchored on the factual
determination that the COMELEC resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate was already final since his motion for reconsideration was already
denied by the Commission when canvassing of the votes started. Hence, the segregated and separately
tallied votes containing only the similar first names/nicknames and surnames of
the two (2) candidates were considered as not really stray votes. We held that
the separate tallies validated by the COMELEC
actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent
confusion caused by a nuisance candidate.
The purpose of an election protest is
to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the
lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the
canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate.
Election contests, therefore, involve the adjudication not only of private and
pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of paramount public interest
considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the
electorate.[22]
In controversies pertaining to nuisance
candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of
confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may
generate. A nuisance
candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has
no bona fide intention to run for the office for
which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the
reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots
with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not
counted for either of them.
In elections for national positions
such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer logistical challenge
posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to
exercise its authority to eliminate
nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious
intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Thus we explained in Pamatong v. Commission on Elections[23]:
"The rationale behind the prohibition
against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not
evinced a bona fideintention
to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are
rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the
election. These practical
difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a
mandated electoral exercise. At
the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these
logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a
disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot
that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court
held:
[T]here is surely an important state
interest in requiring
some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing
the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot -- the
interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception
and even frustration of the democratic [process].
"x x x x
"There is a need to limit the number of
candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions because
the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a
national campaign are allowed to run. Their
names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters
Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to
the government. x x x
"The preparation of ballots is but one
aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates"
to run in the elections. Our
election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office,
such as watchers in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers,
or even the receipt of electoral contributions. Moreover, there are election rules and
regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of
candidates in a given election.
"Given these considerations, the
ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous
enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign
would actually impair the electoral process. x x x
"x x x" [24] [EMPHASIS
SUPPLIED]
Given the realities of elections in
our country and particularly contests involving local positions, what emerges
as the paramount concern in
barring nuisance candidates from participating in the electoral exercise is the
avoidance of confusion andfrustration of the democratic process by preventing a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate, more than the
practical considerations mentioned in Pamatong. A report published by the Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism in connection with the May 11, 1998
elections indicated that the tactic of fielding nuisance candidates with the
same surnames as leading contenders had become one (1) "dirty
trick" practiced in at
least 18 parts of the country. The
success of this clever scheme by political rivals or operators has been
attributed to the last-minute disqualification of nuisance candidates by the
Commission, notably its "slow-moving" decision-making.[25]
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of
proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably exposes thebona
fide candidate to the
confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter's will and
frustrates the same. It may
be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this
case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with
the electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and
other forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably, however, the
adverse effect on the voter's will was similarly present in this case, if not
worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative - over five
thousand - which have been
declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to
overcome private respondent's lead of only 453 votes after the recount.
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the
primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voter. The
inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven
playing field where the bona
fidecandidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of
votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another
candidate with a similar surname. Any
delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in
this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by
advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the
ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on
whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the May 2010
elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of
candidates. What needs to
be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give
weight to relevant circumstances that make the
will of the electorate determinable,
following the precedent in Bautista. These can be gleaned from the findings
of the Commission on the personal circumstances of Edilito C.
Martinez clearly indicating lack of serious intent to run for the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy, foremost of which is his
sudden absence after such filing. In
contrast to petitioner who is a well-known politician, a former municipal mayor
for three (3) terms and a strong contender for the position of Representative
of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu (then occupied by his mother), it seems too obvious that Edilito C.
Martinez was far from the voters' consciousness as he did not even campaign nor
formally launch his candidacy. The HRET likewise failed to mention the total
number of votes actually cast for Edilito
C. Martinez, which can support petitioner's contention that the
"MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ" votes could not have been
intended as votes for Edilito C. Martinez.
Petitioner should not be prejudiced by
COMELEC's inefficiency and lethargy. Nor
should the absence of objection over straying of votes during the actual counting bar
petitioner from raising the issue in his election protest. The evidence clearly shows that
Edilito C. Martinez, who
did not even bother to file an answer and simply disappeared after filing his
certificate of candidacy, was an unknown in politics within the district,
a "habal-habal" driver who had neither the financial
resources nor political support to sustain his candidacy. The similarity of his surname with
that of petitioner was meant to cause confusion among the voters and spoil
petitioner's chances of winning the congressional race for the Fourth
Legislative District of Cebu. As it turned out, there were thousands of ballots
with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line
for Representative, votes considered
stray by the BEI and not
counted in favor of petitioner, and which the HRET affirmed to be invalid
votes. Had the Commission
timely resolved the petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance
candidate, all such ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C.
MARTINEZ" would have been counted in favor of petitioner and not
considered stray, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 4116,[26] issued in relation to the finality of
resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, which provides:
“This pertains to the finality of decisions
or resolutions of the Commission en
banc or division,
particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of
candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance
candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an
election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to
guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special
action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby
RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc
of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and executory
after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme
Court;
x x x
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc
on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance candidate has the
same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;
(5) the
decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where
the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be
immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is
seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not
be considered stray
but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules
inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed.” [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
We held in several cases that the
judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference, unless
rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.[27] The
power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a
very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of
direction that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.[28] Grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility. The
grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[29] Respondent HRET gravely abused its
discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly
elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the
final outcome of revision showing 5,401
ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written
on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted
in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all
relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been
intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a nuisance
candidate in a final judgment.
Ensconced in our jurisprudence
is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests
especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by technical infirmities. An
election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to
dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is
imperative. [30] The
prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing
uncertainty and confusion
in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the
case at bar, final
judgments declaring a nuisance candidate
should effectively cancel
the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance
candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing
certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any
petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and
the votes counted and canvassed.
We therefore hold that ballots
indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position
may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered
stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final
judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" should be credited to
petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent.
Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning
margin of 4,948 votes.
G.R. No. 163271
January
15, 2010
In Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[21] we held that for a question to be one of law, it must
involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of
facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.[22]
Well-settled is the rule
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Factual findings of the
lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, and in fact
accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the
record.[23] Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion,[24] even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
In Philippine Airlines, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, [41] we held that factual
findings of the CA which are supported by substantial evidence are binding,
final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. A departure from this rule may be warranted where
the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions
of the trial court,[42] or when the same is
unsupported by the evidence on record.
In Sps. Solivel v. Judge Francisco,[44] we held that:
x x x in order that the holder of a certificate for
value issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary instrument may be
considered a holder in good faith for value, the instrument registered should
not be forged. When the instrument presented is forged, even if
accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the registered
owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the
forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.
x x x The innocent purchaser for value protected by
law is one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed
by the registered owner himself, not by a forged deed, as the law
expressly states. x x x
In Instrade, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,[45] we reiterated the said
ruling maintaining that “[A]s early as Joaquin v. Madrid, x x x, we said that in
order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the
registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in good
faith and for value, the instrument registered should not be forged”. Indubitably, therefore,
the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale did not convey any title to herein
petitioners. Consequently, they cannot take refuge in
the protection accorded by the Torrens system on titled
lands.
Thus, we hold that with the presentation of
the forged deed, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of
title, the registered owner did not thereby lose his title, and neither does
the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the said property.
Hence, this case falls under the purview of
Article 1410 of the Civil Code which provides that an action to declare the
inexistence of void contracts does not prescribe.[50]
We agree with the respondents. The supposed vendor's
signature having been proved to be a forgery, the instrument is totally void
or inexistent as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article
1409 of the Civil Code.[51] According to Article
1410, "the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe”. The inexistence of a
contract is permanent and incurable which cannot be cured either by
ratification or by prescription.[52]
G.R. No. 164436 January 15, 2010
Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the
dismissal of the action.[15] Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court
clearly provides:
Sec.
11. Misjoinder
and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added
by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
A liberal construction of the Rules is apt in
situations involving excusable formal errors in a pleading, as long as the
same do not subvert the essence of the proceeding, and they connote at least
a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules.[16]The Court is not precluded from rectifying
errors of judgment, if blind and stubborn adherence to procedure would result
in the sacrifice of substantial justice for technicality. To deprive
respondents, particularly Dorotea, of their claims over the subject property
on the strength of sheer technicality would be a travesty of justice and
equity.
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